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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
The pound sterling entered the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM) of the EMS in October 1990. Entry took place at
a central parity of I IIKL=2,95DM with transitional 6%
margins. This move by the UK authorities followed over
two years after the beginning of the sharp tightening of
monetary policy in May 1988, when the extent of the
extreme overheating of the economy of 1987 and 1988
had started to become clear.
Following an uneven deceleration during 1989 and the
first half of 1990, demand and activity weakened very
substantially in the second half of 1990. The economy
entered into recession, with falling manufacturing out-
put and an accelerating rise in unemployment. Although
the onset of the growth slowdown seems to have been
domestic and policy-induced, extemal factors also
turned unfavourable: substantially slower growth in
North America, a deceleration in continental Europe and,
from August 1990, the Gulf crisis.
Inflation, the reduction of which is the main policy
priority, worsened during the slowdown in 1989 and
1990. The underlying rate doubled from around 496 at
the beginning of 1988 to around 8% in late l99O (7 ry%
excluding the effects of oil). Inflationary momentum,
originally demand-led, fed into nominal wage pressures,
which have so far largely persisted despite the move into
recession, and would if sustained lead to a deterioration
in international competitiveness. A difficult period of
adaptation to successful ERM membership may thus be
in prospect.
Analysis of economic performance over the longer term
suggests that inllation is one of a number ofkey areas of
concern. Among others, there is a tendency for the pat-
tern of growth to be biased towards private consumption
at the expense of investment. Important factors may be
the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing and other
features of the housing market. Low private sector sav-
ing, only partly compcnsated by high public sector sav-
ing, thus proved insufficient to finance the levels of
investment achieved during the later part of the 1980s -
levels which, even in 1988, at the height of the lasr cycle,
were not exceptional by international standards.
Contributing to the difficulties of controlling inflation is
a labour market which still exhibits insufficient flexi-
bility, despite the major reforms undertaken since 1979.
A final main area of concern is the current external
deficit. In 1989 this reached almost 4% of CDP. Al-
though the major increase in the deficit clearly resulted
from overheating, it is of concern that underlying trends
may be adverse, particularly for manufactures.
The policy structure in place since 1980 has relied on a
nominal monetary and fiscal policy framework - the
Medium Tenn Financial Strategy (MTFS) - for the con-
trol of inflation, while an ambitious programme of sup-
ply - side reform has been pursued to improve the
economy's growth potential.
In the 1980s the authorities found it difficult to achieve
a successful approach to monetary policy. From the mid-
1980s, evident difficulties in assessing the response to
fi nancial deregulation and statistical underestimation of
the strength of the economy led to what, in retrospect,
was an inappropriately loose monetary stance before
corrective action was undertaken beginning in 1988.
The change of monetary regime as a consequence of
ERM participation now imposes obvious constraints on
policy. [n particular, although the current weakness of
the economy and the impending decline in inflation can
be expected to put downward pressure on nominal inter-
cst rates, reductions wiU be constrained by the need to
maintain the exchange rate. ERM membership does
nevertheless provide the opportunity to rebuild the pol-
icy credibility-in the domestic economy and in financial
markets-eroded during the 1980s. Gains in credibility
should be reflected in swifter disinllation and greater
convergence between UK interest rates and those of the
UK's ERM partners.
The credibility problem, particularly the failure to main-
tain control of inflation in the second half of the 1980s,
has also affected the fiscal side of the MTFS. Nominal
targets for revenue and borrowing have been subject to
substantial annual revisions; in contrast, firmer control
of nominal public expenditure has lcd to real growth in
spending lower than planned. The financial balance of
the general government sector thus moved into very
large surplus in the financial year 1988-89. Since then
the surplus has declined, and a modest financial delicit
is projected by the Commission services for the current
financial year, ending in March 1991. This reflects sig-
nificant growth in expenditure,, in volume as well as
nominal terms. Higher deficits are projected for the two
forthcoming financial years, the consequence of ex-
pected cyclical weakness in the economy rather than an
easing of policy.
Although ERM entry has coincided with adverse short-
term trends in the real economy, its contribution to re-
ducing the output and employment costs of disinflation
will be maximised if the authorities'commitment is fully
apparent. A successful move to narrow (2 ttt%o) margins
should help; an essential buttress is that the overall
policy stance remains oriented towards disinflation,
through and beyond the current recession.
Executivc Summary
Enhanced credibility of policy might itself in this way
promote morc rapid adjustment of wago and pricc set-
ting. Improvements in economic structurc, pureued as
part of an ongoing process of supply-side reforur, could
also include encouraging more moderate pay-bargain-
ing, taking account of the [JK's position within the ERM
and the evolving single market. A new approrch, suc-
cessfully pursued, could bring forward th€ stttinment of
robust growth achievcd in conditions of low inflation.
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PART I
United Kingdom: Economic Policy and
Prospects in the ERM
Introduction
St:rling entered the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of
the EMS in October 1990, ending many months of un-
certainty as to the timing and conditions of entry. The
move, at a central rate of DM 2,95 to the pound with
Graph I
transitional 696 margins, was accompanied by a one
percentage point reduction in short-term interest rates to
l4%o, exactly a year after these were raised to l5%.
The cut in interest rates was made against increasing
indications that the economy had already embarked upon
a period of substantially slower growth, and was possib-
ly already in recession; this followed a more hesitant
slowdown over the previous year and a half from the
extreme overheating of 1986-88. ERM entry was also
justified by the government on the ground that inflation
was soon expected to peak, and then to start on a
downward trend. However, actual inflationary perfor-
mance worsened substantially during the course of 1990,
with the differential against ERM members widening in
advance of entry (Graph 1)
The progressive slowdown in demand and activity
during 1989 and 1990 led to a rise in unemployment
beginning in April 1990. The nominal exchange rate,
after falling over much of 1989, recovered from early
1990. This recovery gathered strength during the course
of the year on speculation about ERM entry. Because of
accompanying rising UK wage costs and falling produc-
tivity the real exchange rate rose substantially (Graph 2).
The current account has nevertheless recently improved
as an easing of domestic demand and of pressures on
capacity have so far resulted in an increase in net ex-
Ports.
Short-term prospects indicate a difficult period of adap-
tation to the sustained low inflation performance consis-
tent with successful ERM membership. It seems likely
thal wages will decelerate only slowly, in which case
maintenance of sterling's central rate will imply the real
exchange rate continuing to appreciate. Pressure will
thus come to bear particularly on the foreign trading
sectors of the economy with employment losses at the
whole economy level likely to continue for some time.
Recent developments
The 1986-88 overheating reflected an unanticipatedly
strong response by the private scctor to the financial
deregulation of the 1980s. Credit expansion increased
greatly, while the monetary stance remained largely ac-
commodating. Recognition of the degree of overheating
provoked a progressive tightening of short-term interest
rates from mid- to late 1988, with a further one percent-
age point increase in October 1989. As acknowledged by
the authorities) l, mistakes were made in not recognising
the extreme strength of demand in the 1986-88 period
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and in thus applying the policy brakes too late and
initially too lightly. This helps explain the slowness of
the subsequent adjustment.
The momentum of demand growth continued into 1989
but at a reduced pace. Final domestic demand growth in
1989 was halved compared with 1988 (3,57o compared
with7,29o, Table 1). Meanwhile the symptoms of over-
heating grew worse rather than better. The current ac-
count deficit peaked in 1989 rt 3,79o of GDB although
underlying volume trends already indicated a very strong
recovery in net exports from early 1989 (Graph 3).
Underlying inllation worsened considerably from 1988
for reasons including the labour market continuing to
tighten, exchange rate depreciation and generally rising
prices of traded goods.
The nominal effective exchange rate peaked in January
1989 (Graph 4), supported by the level of UK interest
rates. Thereafter financial market confidence weakened
progressively and the exchange rate fell l2?o through the
remainder of the year to a trough in December. The fall
in the exchange rate had a considerable effect on easing
monetary conditions overall 2; in addition there was
some limited and unintended easing of fiscal policy (see
below).
The marked decline in household saving during the
1980s was strongly associated, as the decade progressed,
with the interaction of adjustment to financial liberalisa-
tion and increasing net wealth from housing (reflecting
high owner occupation and generous tax treatment) and
financial assets. Lower household saving was the main
factor behind declining national saving during the
1980s. When investment recovered sharply from 1986 to
1988, to levels in relation to GDP more comparable with
those overseas, the inadequacy of national saving was
reflected in the current account deficit and later infla-
tionary prerrrr", 3.
kr 1990 the economy continued to register moderate
growth in the first half. However, the factors sustaining
growth weakened. The exchange rate appreciated, par-
ticularly from April when speculation began in earnest
on early ERM entry. The below-potential growth of the
onshore economy from 1989 eventually led to a turn-
around in the labour market. Unemployment began ris-
ing from April, with the rise accelerating sharply in the
final quarter. The effect on the personal sector of the
further rise in interest rates in October 1989 was delayed
to some extent by many institutions holding back a
Graph 4
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Table l: GDP end lts expendlture components rt
constrnt merket prlces
(% chenge on prevlousperlod)
1988 1989 t990tt9pl.l992*
Prlvate consumptlon
Governmentconsumptlm
Grcs flxed lovestment
. Resldeotlal (20%)
. Buslness
- Other
Flnal domestlcdemand
Stodrbulldlng (% of GDP)
Totd domestlcdemand
Exports ofgds & serv.
Imports olgds & serv.
GDP (average Eeasure)
Deflators l:
- Prlvate consumptlon
- GDP (expend. meas)
2,4 I,l 1,9
2,5 1,9 1,6
-1,2 -1,6 2,5
-7,1 0,7 1,4
-1,0 -3,1 3,2
8,2 5,5 0,0
1,8 0,8 1,9
-0,3 -0,7 0,0
0,9 0,4 \7
5,1 1,7 3,2
2,5 0J 4,r
1,5 0,7 2,4
7,0 6,3 4,9
7,7 6,8 4,E
7,2 3,9
0,5 0,9
14,8 4,E
5,7 -3,0
20,4 7,r
-2,5 3,2
7,2 3J
1,0 0,6
8,0 3,1
o,2 4,1
t2,E 7,0
4,6 2,2
4,9 6,1
6,7 7,0
Forecagts of thc Commigrion rerviccr, November 1990
l) Adjusted for impact of Community Charge
2l
3)
A rule of thumb, suported by most econometric models, is that a 47o fall in the exchange rate rcughly correspords a a l9o
point reduction in short-term interest rates.
A discussion of these issues can be found in 'The United Kingdom", Country Studies, Economic Paper No. 79, CFf.
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, July 1990.
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further rise in mortgaSe rates until March 1990, and
because many mortgage schemes are subject to annual
review 4. Conrum"rs' expenditure continued to grow;
nevertheless the depression in the housing market
damaged consumer confidence: average house prices fell
from late 1989. The corporate sector began a more
serious readjustment, with cutbacks in capital expendi-
ture and employment.
In the second half of the year there was an abrupt
deterioration in the economy. Early evidence that the
economy entered a recession in the third quarter of 1990
was later confirmed by GDP data showing all the major
expenditure components having declined. Non-oil out-
put declined rn% inthethird quarter (total GDP dropped
19o). Manufacturing output has declined steadily since a
peak in April; more significantly, the decline is con-
centrated in investment goods, where the level in
November was already 9io below that in April. The
available data for the fourth quarter indicate a further
weakening. Survey data point to the very significant
reduction in business and consumer confidence. A sub-
stantial slowdown in growth of the monetary aggregates-
a principal justification for October's one percentage
point reduction in interest rates-also underlines the
decline in demand.
To some extent the UK downturn may reflect a more
general slowing of the indusuial economies:signs have
also emerged of a weakening in the continental European
economies, with the notable exception of Germany,
while the USA and Canada have also entered into reces-
sion. Weaker overseas demand would help explain why
the downturn in the UK appeared relatively swiftly.
Early uncertainty in the Gulf, eventually leading to war,
has played a role. Nevertheless, the main reasons appear
to be of domestic origin, especially the tighter monetary
stance imposed since 1988 and a real exchange rate that
has erratically but eventually tightened.
lnflation, lagging the weakening of demand, worsened
progressively during 1990, with sharply higher petrol
prices because of the Gulf crisis from the third quarter.
Inflation was considerably aggravated at the "headline"
level by the introduction of the local authority Com-
munity Charge from April 5, by higher mortgage interest
rates and by the effect on the composition of the index
of the previous house price boom.
In the first half of 1990 the improvement in the external
current account registered in 1989 was not fully sus-
tained, apparently reflecting recovery of domestic
demand (Graph 5). However, in the second half the
slowing domestic and international economy was evi-
dent in decline in imports and the stabilisation of ex-
ports, and the trade deficit fell.
Short-term prospects
The forecasts of the Commission services, prepared in
October and early November 1990, suggest a largely
cyclical recovery in UK output prospects from I ate 199 I ,
with underlying growth remaining below potential in
1992 (see Tables 1-3). Total GDP in 1992 is boosted by
a sharp recovery in oil output. Output is expected to grow
by tn% in 199 I and by 2 w % in 1992 (2% for the non-oil
economy in 1992), with the manufacturing sector under
particular strain and with unemployment rising
Table 2 : Output by scctor
(% change on prevlous pcrlod )
% GDP 1985 1988 1989 1990+1991*1992*
Energy & water (1I)
- Oil & gas extract (6)
Maoulacturlng (Z)
Construc{lon (6)
Servlces and other (5t)
Non-olt GDPr
-4,4 -9,5 -1,2 -3,2 4,9
-8,6 -18,6 4,9 -4,9 8,8
73 43 0,2 4,7 3,0
9,0 4,t 1,8 -0,8 1,6
5,1 3,4 2,O t,7 1,9
5,7 3,5 r,l 0,8 2,1
GDP, output meas (100) 4,9 2,4 1,3 0,6 2,4
GDP, averagenreilure 4.6 2.2 1,5 0.7 2.4
* Forecests of the Commirsicr servicer, Novcmbcr 1990
I ) GDP output melsure excluding oil and gas ertraction
4)
5)
About 6(}7o of UK mortgages are floating rate and payments thus normally respond quickly to changes in short-term intere.st
rates. Of the remainder, about half of building society schenres are adjusted uurually in tlrc spring.
In England and Wales. The tax had already been effect in Scotland from 1989 while Northern heland was unaffected.
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dcflator, adjusted to remove the impact of the Com-
munity Charge) is forecast to slow to 5 tn%o p.a. by the
end of l99l and to 4 rtz%o p.a. by the end of 1992; the
annual rise in wages and salaries per head falls to 7 uq%
by the end of the first year and to 6 Uq%" by end-1992.
The household saving ratio, 7 ua?o by mid-1990, con-
tinues to rise progressively to over 97o, consequent on
low real private consumption growth. The current ac-
count deficit stabilises at27o of GDP in 1991 and 1992
after 3?o in 1990.
The government's own forecast published in November,
to the end of 1991, is very similar (the chief difference
from the Commission forecast is in projecting higher
private consumption growth in 1991 and lower public
consumption). However, a more substantial downturn,
consequent on less buoyant external conditions, in addi-
tion to the continued appreciation of the real exchange
rate, or further falls in investment expenditures, cannot
be ruled out. The crisis in the Gulf is a major uncertainty
which has very probably further disturbed confidence.
The indicators available since these forecasts were pre-
pared have suggested the possibility of a more severe
recession than projected by the Commission or UK auth-
orities.
Key areas ofconcern
As a consequence of the severe overheating in 1986-88
serious imbalances in the economy emerged: the current
account deteriorated significantly, and inflation later
rose sharply. These imbalances continue to characterize
current macroeconomic performance, Though the cur-
rent account deficit has contracted somewhat, under-
lying inflation continued to worsen until the fourth
quarter of 1990. Sterling's participation in the ERM has
made more urgent the achievement of low inflation and
better internal and external balance,
A growth pattern blased towards prlvate consump-
tlon
The rapid expansion of domestic demand in the period
1986-1988 took place against a changing financial and
economic background. As noted above, financial re-
forms had eased constraints on borrowing and made
housing wealth more liquid. At the same time, disposable
income rose strongly in response to high employment
and real wage growth and as a result of the 1987 and 1988
tax cuts. The depreciation ofsterling in late 1986 and the
decline in interest rates following the stock market crash
a year later eased monetary conditions and contributed
to the inflation potential.
This pattern of developments strongly reinforced exist-
ing structural features of the economy unduly in favour
of private consumption. The decline in household saving
since the early 1980s, referred to in the review ofrecent
developments, accelerated. This was associated particu-
larly with wealth effects from the appreciation of
residential property and financial assets which fuelled
credit growth within the newly liberalised financial sys-
tem. The strength of the housing market was reflected
also in demand for housing-related consumer durables.
In the period 1979-89 private consumption grew on aver-
age by 3,3?o p.a. compared with only 2,3?o p.a. for total
GDP; in the four-year period 1986-89 these figures were
5,77op.a. and3,84o respectively. The strong recovery of
investment back to more nornal levels in relation to
GDP, when it finally came in 1987 and 1988, could not
then be accommodated, given low saving, without
throwing the economy radically out of balance. While
supply-side reforms had undoubtedly raised potential
output, this was, it appears, inadequate compared to
demand growth.
Teble 3: Recent developments rnd short-term
prospects: other key elements
(% chrnge on prevlous perlod unless
speclfled otherwlse)
1988 1989 1990*1991*1992*
IINANCIALFACTORS
Interest rates r
.3.m lnterbank
.20-y govt bood
Monetaryaggregates
-MO
.M4
GGFB', catendryr
GGFB, flnancl yr
Exchange rates
. DIVT/I.'KL
.USD/I'IKL
LABOTJRMARIGT
Comp of employees
per head
Employrnent
Unemploynrent 3
EXTERNAL CUR BALL 1
WLDTRADEASSUMPS.
Volume
Olt prlce 5
8,1 8,8 10,4 8,7 6,7
10,3
9,4
6,9
17,6
1,0
t,4
3,12
1,78
13,9 14,8
9,6 tt,4
5,9 l
t8,2 :
o,9 -0,2
0,0 -0,1
3,0E 2,88
1,64 1,76
13,5 I1,5
ll,3 10,7
2,93 2,93
t,89 1,95
::
-0,7 -0,6
-0,7 -0,4
3,3 2,t 2,0
8,5 7,0 6,4
-3,2 -3,7 -2,8
9,5 7,9 6,9
15,0 18.0 24.0
-0,4 0,0
7,3 E,0
-2,O -2,1
4,6 4,9
29,O E,O
* Forecasts of the Commission services, November 1990
l) Period average, %
2) General govemment financial balance, % of GDP
3) % of civilian labour force, SOEC standardised definition
4) % ofGDP
5) USD/bbl, EC averagc cif price.
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Teble 4: Prlceg Errnlngs end Costs
(% chenge over r yerr eerller)
1990
a4Q3Q21990 Ql1986
Prlcee
Retdl prlce tndex
-All ltems
-Underlylng r
Producer prlces ln mmufaclurlng
-Materlals and fud lnputs
-Output (dometlc sales)
Import prlces 2
of whlch:
-Goods
.Non-oll goods
New hurse prlces r
Nationel rccounts
dellators'
.Prlvateconsumptlon
-GDP et market prlcee
Earnlnge and cosfs
Underlylng earnlngs
-Wholeecooonry
.Manufacturing
Unlt taborr coats s
-Wholeeconomy
-Manulacturing
3,4
3,3
-7,6
4,3
-4,4
-6,0
4,6
17,0
4,4
3,5
7,5
79
5,5
4,2
2,8
1,8
r75
3,3
4,5
-1,0
-1, I{J
26,O
10,4 10,0
7,7 8,0
9J
6,8
-1,0
6,3
3,2
2,6
43
5,8
7,t
5,7
5,7
5,1
65
6J
5,6
16.0
4,9
4,4
4,2
3,5
3,1
3,8
2,6
4,9 5,8 n.a 6,2 6,9
6,7 5,8 n.a. 5,9 7,2
8,8 9.1 n.& 95 9,t
8,7 8,7 n.a. 9,2 9,4
6,E 9,2 n.a. l0,l lO,2
2,6 5,0 n.a- 8,2 7,3
4,3
5,r
42
1,7
95 7,8
7,2 6,0
4,1 29
5,6 5,4
n.& 7,3
n.a- 6,7
n.a- 6,4
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Inflatlon
Economic overheating resulted in progressively worse
inflation from early 1988.
In 1990 the year-on-year increase reached 10,9% in
September and October. The retail price index (RP[)
measure of inflation, which includes mortgage interest
payments and the community charge, is subject to policy
shocks and overestimates the extent of deterioration in
the UK's inllation perfonnance during this period. How-
evrrr, the deterioration is also confirmed by othcr
measures (Table 4). The annual increase in the RPI
excluding mortgage interest payments and the com-
munity charge, for example, rose from below 3% in the
summer of 1986 to a peak of 8,49o in October 1990.
Additionally excluding the effects of oil indicates an
annual inllation rate of about 7 w% rn late-1990. C;on-
sequently, the inflation differential between the UK and
its main EC partners has widened substantially.
The acceleration of inllation is reflected in wages. Earn-
ings growth decelerated substantially in the frst half of
the 1980s, falling below 8% p.a. in the spring of 1986 at
a time when unemployment exceeded l0% of the labour
force. Earnings growth then crept back up, with occa-
sional remissions during 1988 and 1989. By mid-1990
the underlying growth rate in earnings reached l0% p,a,,
only decelerating slightly in the fourth quarter. Produc-
tivity growth has slowed appreciably as output growth
has declined but with delayed repercussions on the la-
bour market (Table 5). Even in manufacturing, the de-
cline in output has brought to a halt the growth of output
per head. The annual growth of manufacturing unit la-
bour costs rose to about l07o in 1990; for the whole
economy the rise in the year to the third quartcr was 1296.
If inflation is to be reduced wage increases will thus have
to decelerate substantially, probably to a medium-term
norm of well under 5% p,a, This would involve at least
a halving of the present rate of nominal increase.
Labour market adJustment
The UK authorities undertook significant labour market
reforms in the 1980s. Among the most important were:
. prograrnmes to improve the suitability of the long-
term unemployed for work, and their ability to find
work,
. reform of the unemployment benefit system to encour-
age job search and to improve job-matching,
. reform of industrial relations legislation to improve
access to work for job-seekers and to enable more
flexible and cost-effective working patterns,
. legislation to enhance the rate of growth of small firms
and thereby to improve the level of competition in
product markets.
The outcome has been an improvement in the trend rate
of growth of productivity during the past decade. Fur-
thermore, the acceleration of wage inflation during the
cxpansion of 1986-88 was considerably less pronounced
than in previous periods with excess demand, indicating
an enhanced flexibility of the labour market following
the supply-side reforms. Nevertheless, in comparison
with other industrial countries, IJK real wage behaviour
has displayed greater rigidity, and this has occurred
despite the record levels of unemployment experienced
during the first half of the decade o.
The factors explaining wage behaviour in the UK are not
fully undcrstood. However, a number of factors have
contributed to the appearance of inflationary wage
trends in r€cent years:
. rapid growth of activity in recent years has magnified
important shortages of skills in some key sectors and
regions and revealed a deficiency in the stock of
skilled manpower,
. insufficient mobility of labour, partly attributable to
failures in the structure of collective bargaining but
also caused by imbalance in regional economic activ-
ity and the implications of this imbalance for the hous-
ing market,
. the survival of inflationary expectatiorur amongst pay
bargainers, and the entrenched view that compensation
for past inflation is a property right.
The present structure of collective bargaining (a patch-
work of centralised and decentralised agreements) may
itself contribute to the development of inflationary
prcssures in the labour market. The structure enables the
transmission of nominal wage settlements from high
activity to lower activity (or lower value-added) regions.
It also facilitates the imitation of relatively high wage
settlements across bargaining groups, and this process
might become even more significant in the single market
if imitation occurs across national borders. The import-
ance of imitation might be reduced or moderated if an
effective dialogue between pay bargainers and the gov-
crnmcnt were able to identify a sustainable path for real
wages in the context of ERM participatiou.
The balance of payments
Movements in the current account balance are highly
correlated with movements in domestic demand relative
to domestic output, The large external deficit of recent
6) lrbour mrket urd wage adjustment in tre UK is frrther cxplored h Put IL Chapter I ard in 'The United Kingdom", op. ciL
yp.19-22.
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years reflects principally the rapid expansion of domes-
tic demand which has taken place. Chapter 2 in Part II
explores the balance of payments in greater depth,
Underlying the deterioration in the external balance
since 1986 is essentially an insufficiency of domestic
savings to finance domestic invesunent spending. Con-
sequently, this excess demand for savings has been fin-
anced through external inflows, reflected in the current
account deficit. The government has taken the view that,
since the large excess demand for savings and the dete-
rioration in the current external balance principally re-
flect private sector decisions, an external deficit should
not be a subject for policy concern except as a symptom
of excess demand in the economy. However, current
account developments throughout the 1980s pose im-
portant questions regarding both macroeconomic and
resource allocation policies.
. Recent inflation trends have led to an appreciation of
sterling's real exchange rate. Between 1987 and June
1990 competitiveness as measured by the real ex-
change rate (based on normalized unit labour costs in
manufacturing) has appreciated by 9?o, mainly refl ect-
ing growth in labour costs.
. The principal source of the deterioration in &e current
account balance has been the balance on merchandise
trade and, in particular, trade in manufactures. The
secular widening of the deficit in these products raises
the issue of whether the UK's relative ability to com-
pete internationally over a broad range of technology-
intensive goods may have declined over the longer
term. While it is encouraging that the UK share of
world trade in manufactures has been broadly stable
since 1984, this period was one ofvery strong produc-
tivity growth and improving cost. competitiveness. It
will be more difficult to extend these competitiveness
gains into the medium-term,
. The surpluses on interest, profits and dividends (IPD)
transactions, which provided an offsetting element to
the rising deficits on merchandise trade in the 1980s,
have been reduced sharply in 1990. tf this decline
becomes permanent, the balance of international trans-
actions would be structurally weaker.
. Sustained current account deficits have potentially
adverse implications for the exchange rate. Interest
rates may incorporate an unobservable, but possibly
significant, risk premium associated with the exist-
ence of an external deficit, leading to expectations of
depreciation. Such depreciation expectations could in-
hibit a convergence of interest rates and contribute to
inJlation expectations.
. The sharp deterioration in recent years in the UK's
basic balance (i.e. the current account plus long-term
capital flows) has meant that capital inflows of a short-
term nature have been the principal instrument for
financing these deficits. Such inflows are palticularly
volatile and easily reversible. They may have con-
tributed to the need to keep interest rates high. The
increased volatility and reversability of even "long-
term" capital flows, given intemational financial de-
regulation, strengthens the point in relation to the
continued existence of a significant current account
deficit.
Sterling's membership of the ERM severely limits the
option to offset losses in competitiveness, resulting from
high wage and price inflation, throughnominal exchange
rate depreciation. Indeed, as stressed earlier, it seems
inevitable that for some time the real exchange rate will
appreci ate, eroding competitiveness further. The princi-
pal means to arrest and reverse this trend is through low
inflation and substantial productivity growth. While the
financing of current account deficits may be eased with-
in the ERM, further expansion of the UK economy could
be inhibited if it were to be associated with sustained
large-scale external imbalances.
The monetary and fiscal policy framework
Since 1980 the government has set monetary and fiscal
policy within the framework of its Medium Term Finan-
cial Strategy (MTFS). While the precise formulation of
policy and the medium-term projections for real and
nominal output, monetary growth and the public finan-
ces have been revised each year, the central objective of
the MTFS has remained consistent. This is to provide "a
nominal framework within which the government pur-
sues its objective of bringing down the rate of infla-
tion" 7.
The MTFS has remained similar in design from 1984 up
to its latest March 1990 version. Monetary policy has
been framed using a narrow money (M0) target range but
with considerable attention given to the exchange rate
and the broader monetary and credit aggregates. The
public finance projections have focused on the implica-
tions for public sector borrowing and recently on debt
rePayment.
The MTFS approach is examined in the following two
sections, respectively on monetary and exchange rate
policy and on fiscal policy, focusing on the requirements
for successful participation in the exchange rate mech-
anism.
7) Financial Stateme,nt andBudget Report, March 1989.
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Monetary and exchange-rate pollcy
The problem of indicators and credibility
Monetary policy was considered the principal element
of the new stability-oriented adjustment stratcgy intro-
duced in 1980 in the MTFS. tnitially M3 was targetted.
However, during the 1980s it became increasingly dif-
ficult to interpret the movements of the broad monetary
aggregates because of shifts related to finaneial supply-
side innovation and credit deregulation. The difficulties
led to several changes in the choice of target aggregates
and to monetary control using not only the money stock
figures but other financial and economic ndicators: in-
terest rates, yield curve movements, asset prices and,
notably, the exchange rate.
By 1986, the difficulties in interpreting broad money
were considered so great that broad money targeting was
abandoned t. Giren the abandonment of broad money
targeting, a plausible alternative nominal anchor might
have been the exchange rate. ERM entry was mooted in
late 1985. However, oil prices fell very sharply at the
time, implying a neea for a real depreciation of sterling.
Achieving that depreciation without a nominal exchange
rate movement would have involved a transitory period
of falling prices, and might have proved costly in terms
of output and employment. lnstead, the nominal ex-
change rate was allowed to depreciate sharply during the
course of 1986; broad money growth accelerated. During
this period, the authorities laid emphasis on the largely
offsetting impacts on prices of a falling oil market and a
falling exchange rate.
By late 1986, downward market pressure on the ex-
change rate came to an end: the competitive position had
improved, and unemployment had finally started falling.
The time seemed appropriate to place more weight on
the nominal exchange rate as an indicator. Unfortunate-
ly, while the money demand implications of the financial
deregulation carried out during the period were recog-
nized, the aggregate demand implications were less ob-
vious. Improved consumer and investor confidence
combined with vastly increased borrowing opportunities
to produce the overheating of the economy discussed
earlier. The appropriate response would have been to
tighten monetary policy significantly. However, from
early 1987 until the spring of 1988, sterling "shadowed"
the DM within a range widely thought to be from DM
2,90 to DM 3,00, with upward pressure on the exchange
rate set by cuts in interest rates (in addition to the
international lowering of interest rates after the stock
exchange collapse of October 1987).
It is clear that doubts about the indicator function of the
aggregates led, during 1987 and early 1988, to excessive
reliance on an indicator that was at the time even more
misleading, the exchange rate. In retrospcit it is clear
that overall monetary conditions thus became too loose.
By the time intense market pressure induced the
authorities to "uncap" sterling in the early spring of 1988
there was a grest deal of inflationary momentum in the
economy. Although interest rates began to rise in May
1988, it was not until November of that year that the
seriousness of the problem was fully recognized. The
tardiness of the policy response inevitably made it more
severe, with base rates being forced to a peak of. lS%by
late 1989, double the level ofSpring 1988.
From early 1989 sterling fell under the impact of the
markets' worries about political factors, and their per-
ceived effect on the disinflationary conrmitment of the
authorities. In addition, there were perceptions that ad-
justment of the large curent account deficit might call
for sterling depreciation, despite a further rise in interest
rates in May (to l4?o from l3%) and October 1989 (to
l5%). This change in market perceptions of the UK
economy contributed to looser monetary conditions and
made it more difficult for monetary policy to affect
wages and profit margins, since a declining pound en-
larged the room for manoeuwe of companies competing
both abroad and domestically with imports, as well as
contributing directly to inflation through higher import
prices.
The background to ERM cury
The monetary policy mistakes of 1987 and 1988
weakened the anti-inflationary credibility of the
authorities. The need for an anchor capable of reducing
the output and employment costs of disflation by directly
influencing wage and price determination was thus in-
creased.
From May 1990 onwards, the markets began to an-
ticipate early membership of the ERM. The prospect of
a "floor" Io the currency, combined with high yields on
sterling financial assets, pushed sterling up. This
tightened monetary conditions. By October 1990, the
authorities were of the opinion that the slowdown in the
economy in prospect was sufficiently sharp to bring the
prospect of falling inflation, and might even produce an
unnecessarily pronounced economic contraction. They
thus took sterling into the ERM in early October, at the
same time cutting base rates for the first time in two and
a half years.
The decision to enter the ERM at a 2,95 DMAIKLcentral
rate can be characterized as involving a judgement that
the exchange rate was "right", despite the persistence of
a large curent account deficit, in the light of the need to
exert downward pressure on inflation. The shortfall in
domestic demand relative to potential output which will
be involved in restoring external balance will, in the
8) The authorities nevertheless continud o pay auention to b,road aggregates, and also published target ranges for narrow
money, M0. However, fast growttr of the muretary aggregates did not lead o a restrictive monetary policy.
(3)
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absence of nominal depreciation, induce a deceleration
of domestic costs. This will not necessarily involve ex-
plicit policy action:financial pressures on the private
sector will largely determine the timing and extent of
such deceleration. And, for internal balance to be res-
tored, the rate of increase of domestic costs will at some
point have to undershoot temporarily, the rate of cost
increases in partner countries.
Several factors, however, distinguish the present situa-
tion from that of 1985. First, the need to reduce UK
inflation is now more urgent than it was perceived to be
in late 1985. Second, in 1985 the factor appearing to
require a real depreciation (falling oil prices) was itself
an independent egent of disinflation. Third, inllation is
not now decelerating in Europe, most notably in Ger-
many, so that UK inflation undershooting would not
have to involve actual price deflation.
Monctary policy challenges in the ,ratt, context
The United Kingdom has embarked upon ERM member-
ship at a time of particular uncertainty relating not only
to the exteraal environment (the oil shock, the prospects
for the US economy and the dollar) but also to the
functioning of the ERM at a time when the anchor of the
system may be somewhat looser.
Inlluences external to the Community are likely to have
a restraining effect on UK ouput. Internally, the asym-
metric shock represented by German unification may
lead to higher interest rates in Germany; if followed by
other ERM countries, including the United Kingdom,
this would intensify recessionary trends. If the weakness
of activity in the UK leads to a rapid slowdown in "core"
inflation, the wide ERM margins enjoyed by the United
Kingdom could provide sufficient monetary policy
flexibility to reduce interest rates and avoid a major
recession. Indeed, ou the most optimistic scenario, rapid-
ly declining inllation expectations could permit reduc-
tions in interest rates even without a fall in the value of
sterling within its flucruation band.
However, evidence as yet is that wage settlements are
only beginning to decelerate. If wage inllation remains
stubbornly higtr, it carmot be excluded that interest rates
may have to be raised to defend sterling's parity. It
remains to be seen whether ERM entry will itself have a
direct expectational effect, increasing the credibility of
the authorities' commitment to disinflation and thus
reducing the employment and activity costs involved.
Flscal pollcy
The government's approach to budgetary policy, in com-
parison with changes in the monetary and exchange rate
policies 8ko sot out in the Medium-Term Financial
Strategy (IvtTFS), has shown greater stability. Policy has
been presented in rslation to thc government's longer
terrr aims of reducing the shares of taxation and public
expenditure in GDP and of establishing a sustainable
path for public sector borrowing, consistent with
'monetary stabiliry. Medium-term projections have thus
been published of general government receipts, expen-
diture rnd public sector borrowing together with projec-
tions for the path of nominal GDB real growth and
inflation.
Despite this public articulatioa of the key elements of
the public finances, the MTFS has never decisively
gained credibility as an instrument for inlluencing ex-
pectations, particularly with regard to inflation. Chapter
5 of Part II explores in more detail why this should be
so. The most obvious point is that recent paths of infla-
tion projected in successive versions of the MTFS, as in
the official short-term forecasts, have been persistently
exceeded. It is nevertheless possible that the MTFS ap-
proach could be built on to re-establish and enhance the
overall credibility of policy within the framework of
ERM participation. Crucialln the latter should con-
tribute greater nominal stability.
As regards recent trends, the public finances underwent
a rapid move into very large surplus (net debt repayment)
in 1988-89 e, greater in speed or extent than planned by
the government. Debt repayment declined in 1989-90
and official forecasts from November 1990 are for a
further weakening in the current financial year.
Focusing on the general govemment financial balance l0
indicates a similar surplus of about l% of GDP in both
calendar 1988 and 1989 (Table 6). However, Commis-
sion forecasts suggest that this will be followed by a
small deficit in 1990. The reduction in the surplus in
1990 reflects some cyclical weakening (but so far
limited, given the lags in the reaction of the labour
market to output and of corporate tax collection lags),
and significantly higher expenditure, in volume as well
as nominal terms.
Outline expenditure decisions for the l99l-92 and two
following financial years were announced in the Novem-
ber 1990 Autumn Statement. For l99l-1992 the
government's "planning total" for public expenditure
was set ovet lo9o higher than the outturn expected for
1990-91. Total general government expenditure, exclud-
e)
10)
The flurancial yer nrrs from April o Mrctr.
Al0tough the MTFS focuses on the prblic scto'r deh repayment or borrowing requiranent @SDR/PSBR), a beuer guide to
the stance of fiscal policy is given by the general gwemme,nt financial bolance (surplus or deficit, GGFB). The lacer exclu&s
privatisation receipts, lending srd miscellaneous finsrcial transactions which do not materially influence the net worth of the
general government soctor:see Chapter 5 in Part tr which analyses brdgetary policy in more detail. Note, however, 0rat dring
the 1980s ttpre was a significant consolidation of the finances of public orporations.
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ing privatisation proceeds, is projected to increase by
just over 2?o inreal ternu ov€r 1990-91. Compared with
earlier intentions expenditure plans were increased by
about UKL 8 billion (lrrVo of GDP). This represents
notably: higher than expected inflation (particularly be-
cause most transfers are indexed to the rise in the Retail
Prices Index in the year to September, which to Septem-
ber 1990 was 10,996), higher numbers of claimants on
demand-led programmes, higher expenditure on health
and higher current grsnts to local authorities to reduce
the increases in the community charge in April l99l that
would otherwise be required.
In l99l and 1992 it may be difficult for fiscal manage-
ment to maintain an appropriately tight stance for reduc-
ing inflation. There will be pressures on both the
expenditure and taxation fronts, with the overall picture
obscured by cyclical inlluences tending to raise the
financial deficit. Forecasts of the Commission services
indicate financial deficits of ttz-tn?o in both years. The
higher deficits in 1991 nd 1992 are nevertheless prin-
cipally because of more pronouncod cyclical weakness
in the economy. Adjusting for these might indicate a
marginally tighter stance on present policies (assuming
in particular no large-scale tax reductions).
The government has made it clear that it will not normal-
ly resist cyclical inlluences on the budget and that the
"automatic stabilisers" will be allowed to operate. Thus,
while the medium-term objective of a balanced budget
remains, expenditure is unlikely to fall in the short-term
as a proportion of GDP. Movements in taxation, especisl-
ly corporate tax receipts, may have an even larger short-
term influence on changes in thc actual government
financial balance than expenditure changes. The current
move into recession is likely to imply a sharp reduction
in corporate tax receipts from the l99l-92 financial year,
while personal income tax receipts will be restrained by
an absence of further employment growth (and perhaps
reductions).
Overall, the need to bear down on inflation implies that
the fiscal stance cannot afford to be significantly relaxed
beyond normal cyclical influences on revenue and ex-
penditure. A possible tsrget to aim for is a financial
deficit roughly balanced (or in very moderatc deficit ll)
over the medium term. This is somewhat more ambitious
than the MTFS's current concept of a "balanced budget*
in the sense of zero borrowing, given that the latter
includes privatisation receipts of UKL 5 billion p.a. The
actual deficit in the short term would, ofcourse, be larger
because of cyclical effects.
1 1 ) A 'moderate defrcit" might be targeted at a constmt general government net financial liabilities to GDP ratio. Given s curent
ratio of a little uder 20% and sustainable growth of rowd23l4% p.a., this would imply a medium-term deficit target of
arovr,d lD?o of GDP. Cf. the formuluion of the 1988 MTFS wi0r a medium-term taget for the PSBR excluding privatisation
receipts of l7o of GDP.
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Within these overall constraints there remain oppor-
tunities for both continuing with fiscal reform (for both
taxation and public expenditure management) and for
varying the overall composition and level ofexpenditure
and taxation. Consideration of supply side needs, ex-
plored further below, suggests that there are probably
grounds for higher public investment to strengthen the
infrastructure.
For taxation there are also obvious weaknesses, particu-
larly with regard to housing where, compared to other
major countries, cunent treatment is especially generous
to owner occupation in general and mortgage financing
in particular. The main reliefs are complete exemption
from capital gains tax, the absence (since the abolition
of domestic rates) of any tax linked to capital or imputed
rental values and the income tax relief (limited to a
non-indexed ceiling) on mortgage interest payments.
This issue is explored further in Chapter 4 of Part II
(Housing). The 1986-t8 overheating was aggravated by
the role played by housing finance in a context of a very
high ratio of owner occupation to overall housing tenure
and financial liberalisation. This combination seems to
have been a major reason why private saving declined
excessively relative to investment. [t seems desirable to
aim for much lower subsidisation of housing through the
tax system, even if full neutraliry is not achieved.
The supply-side and the Single Market
The United Kingdom has pursued supply-side policies
in the past decade which are particularly supportive in
the transition to a world of greater competition and freer
trade. Notably,
. financial and capital markets have been liberalised for
several years, providing a stimulus to competition and
activity in domestic financial services,
. subsidies have been reduced, and privatisation has
introduced new opportunities for financing and for
promoting efficiencn
. foreign direct investment has increased and has been
influential in revising work practices,
. reforms in taxation policy have improved incentives
to work and created an environment more conducive
to investment, as well as a more efficient allocation of
investment funds,
. attitudes to the management of resources in the public
sector have been reformed by the introduction of mar-
ket mechanisms and financial evaluation of outputs
('value for money'),
. industrial relations legislation has improved the bal-
ance of power in the labour market and raised optim-
ism and expectations about rates of return on new
assets,
. deregulation of product and labour markets (the attack
on 'red tape') has encouraged small businesses and
created the opportunities for new working patterns and
Practices.
The outcome is measured by an improvement in the trend
rate of growth of productivity. Trends in productivity are
an important predictor of international trade perfor-
mance and research undertaken by, and on behalf of, the
Commission suggests that, despite general trade perfor-
mance being open to question, significant comparative
advantage has been achieved or maintained in several
industries. Telecommunications, computers, pharmaceu-
ticals and financial services should all gain significant
advantages from the Single Market 12.
The commitment to stable exchange-rates inside the
Single Market will make important demands upon the
flexibility of wage determination when confronted with
significant shocks. It also requires the permanent sup-
pression of inflationary pressures arising from within
domestic markets. The past programme of supply-side
reform has made significant progress towards these ob-
jectives for the medium term but a number of important
problems remain. Structural problems in the labour mar-
ket may be identified by,
. evidence showing that pay differentials for skill are
inadequate in some se,ctors to provide incentives for
improvement in abilities, particularly amongst youths
and for example in engineering,
. evidence that many school-leavers are uninterested in
education and training, which is an obvious constraint
upon subsequent progress and prospects,
. evidence that quality of training has been low, and an
inadequate base for subsequent leaming.
The solution of problems in education and training will
be particularly important during a period when enter-
prises are adapting to the needs of the Single Market.
Education and training is vital to the raising of produc-
tivity performance, where average levels are currently
measured to be below those of the major Community
members. Raising productivity levels will be all the
more important if wages were to begin to rise towards
the levels paid in the higher productivity countries.
Important connections can be identified between the
efficiency of the labour and housing markets. The large
differentials in property prices across the United King-
dom reflect the concentration of higher-paid activity in
the South-East quadrant, which is an important con-
straint upon regional mobility of labour. The private
rented property sector has been slow to develop in re-
sponse to recent deregulation, which represents a further
constraint.
12) See European Economy/Social Europe, Special edition l99O p,p325-3210.
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The considerable progress made in privatisation has
nevertheless raised important issues about the extent of
effective competition for those industries or enterprises
which have been transferred to private ownership. The
problems concem the consistency and transparency of
domestic competition policy in ensuring that barriers to
product market entry are removed or reduced and the
potential this should create for truly contestable markets.
Conclusions
The UK has joined the ERM at a time when there is
considerable nominal divergence from the path followed
by its main European partners. While current develop-
ments suggest that underlying UK inflation will decline
over the coming months, the extent and sustainability of
the decline in inflation are by no means certain. Never-
theless, the decision to enter the ERM at this time must
be seen as expressing the government's commitment to
strengthen its anti-inflation stance, and to reduce, and
keep low,^the rate of nominal expansion of the UK
economy ". Membership increases the urgency of reduc-
ing inflation rapidly. It is not itself a sufficient policy for
achieving disinJlation.
It is essential that the policy commitment to observe the
exchange rate target is beyond question. If this precon-
dition is not met, the ERM will fail to serve the objec-
tives of policy stability and predictability, and will make
little contribution to disinflation. It might be argued that
the choice of a 6 percent band for sterling is too wide
and that the narrow band should have been chosen. While
the wide band may be justified on transitional grounds,
a successful transition to the narrow band should in-
crease the disinflationary credibility of the authorities.
There are risks that inflation may prove more stubborn
than currently foreseen, particularly if wage growth re-
mains high. The output cost of disinllation would then
rise. In order to promote adjustment to, and secure dur-
able, price stabilitn disinJlation musr continue to be the
priority of economic policy. In the United Kingdom
wage behaviour has not been compatible with sustained
Iow inflation. The government is, nevertheless, averse to
incomes policies or social dialogue addressed to wage
moderation. In these circumstances the credibility of
overall policy becomes vital as the means through which
the exchange rate commitment in the ERM bears on the
corporate and labour sectors of the economy.
The question of the appropriate stance of policy is of
central importance. In the course of the economic slow-
down, lhe decline in real output and in inflation will
exert downward pressure on nominal interest rates.
Under these circumstances, it would appear appropriate
to expect some easing of market rates, However, it is not
clear how much room for manoeuvre will be available to
the authorities: disinflation requires that real interest
rates (measured by the expected underlying rather than
the RPI rate of inflation) must remain significant to
ensure the transition to low inflation. Premature reduc-
tions in interest rates would erode the credibility of the
policy commitment to price stability.
The need for restraint applies also to fiscal policy. There
has been some easing of policy in the past two years. The
sharp reduction in the public sector debt repaym€nt
(PSDR), and its dependence on asset sales, make it
vulnerable to a variety of pressures. More significantly,
the general government financial balance already ap-
pears to have moved into deficit in the current financial
year, and a deepening of the deficit is expected from
l99l-92. While expected changes from 1991-92 repre-
sent cyclical effects, the increases in public expenditure
announced in this year's Autumn Statement point to the
considerable pressures bearing on the overall stance of
policy. The need to bear down on inllation suggests that
the budgetary stance needs to remain tight. It would be
inappropriate to abandon fiscal restraint -beyond accept-
ing the operation of the conventional stabilisers- in order
to strengthen the recovery.
The recovery in household saving noted in recent quar-
ters is a welcome signal of macroeconomic adjustment,
and will offset the recession-induced decline in public
sector saving. However, the experience in the second
half of the 1980s suggests that financial liberalisation
has had a significant influence on spending and saving
behaviour, In particular, it is now possible to consume
and save according to longer term trends in income, in
contrast to earlier years when financial constraints were
prominent. This has reinforced a medium-term growth
pattern biased towards private consumption. High
growth in the 1980s was over-reliant on consumption
growth, at the expense of falling saving and inadequate
scope for domestic financing of a sufficient level of
investment. While the task of promoting saving in this
environment is more difficult to accomplish, there still
remains the need to raise the savings potential of the
economy to match an adequate level of investment. Fur-
ther progress is required.
Reform of the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing
could have a role to play. Distortions in the housing
market appear to have contributed to the recent overheat-
ing. They also add to labour market rigidities and thus
exacerbate wage inflation. Furthermore, the potential to
realize a greater proportion of the liquidity of housing
wealth in a liberalized financial environment implies
that the expansionary potential of policy will be grearly
amplified with adverse consequences for inflation and
the balance of payments. Should this potential remain
13) The potential for ERM membership to act as a disinflation mechanism in the case of the UK is discussed in 'The United
Kingdom", op. cit., especially p.48-52 and pp. 62-63.
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unchecked within the ERM, it could prove an important
destabilizing factor making adjustment to the exchange
rate constraint very difficult.
The UK has made significant protress in improving the
supply side of the economy. However, further progress
could be useful. Labour market flexibility could be im-
proved further to reduce the costs of disinflation. Grester
labour mobility would contribute to easing wage press-
ures at times of high employment:reform of housing
market policy would be a crucial step. From a longer-
term perspective, the supply of skilled labour needs to
be enhanced, requiring more effective manpower and
training programmes, or an improvement in the incen-
tives to workers to undertake such training. The need to
raise the supply potcntial of the economn already im-
poftant in the context of the European Single Market,
becomes even more decisive in the run-up to economic
and monetary union.
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PART II
SPECIAL TOPICS
Chapter I
Wage Determination and the NAIRU in
the United Kingdom
Strong associations exist between the rate of growth of
output per head and the change in the real wage in the
long-run. Over shorter periods, changes or failures in the
functioning of labour and product markets may disturb
the association and lead to inflationary pressures appear-
ing in the labour markct. Ctanges or failures in the
functioning of the labour market lead to an upward shift
in the real wage when such a shift is unwarranted by the
trend in output per head. Changes or failures in the
labour market may also enable successful resistance to
downward shifts in thc real wage when r downward shift
is warranted by the appearance of r "shock" or disturb-
ancc. The effect of the "shock" or disturbance is to
depress the rate of growth of output. One example of
such a "shock" is a step increase in the real value of
commodity prices. The common effect of an upward
shift in the real wage, or real wage resistance, is to put
upward pressure on unit labour costs.
When confronted with upward pressures on unit labour
costs, firms will raise prices in order to sustain profits.
The ability to raise prices will be constrained by the
elasticity of demand with respect to priccs for products
and services. It will also be constrained by expectations
about the rate of growth of total nominal incomes (aad
the rate of growth of domestic domand) in the fore-
seeable future and expectations about developments in
monetary and fiscal policy during that period. Firms will
eventually need to adjust costs of production as an alter-
native to higher prices and this will lead to lower cm-
ployment and higher unemployment. The urgency of the
need to reduce costs ofproduction will depend upon thc
state of competition in the product market, which itself
determines the elasticity of demand with respect to
prices. Firms operating in monopolistic or oligopolistic
markets will have better opportunities to raise prices, but
the effects will be felt in higher unemployment emongst
those working in more competitive product markets.
The dynamics of the rssociation between productivity,
wages, prices and unemployment are brought together in
the concept of the NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating Infla-
tion Rate of Unemployment). The concept suggests that
there is one level of unemployment which is compatible
with stable inflation, which is the level of unemployment
at which workers are prepared to accept the wage offers
which are consistent with firms'pricing ambitions and
with the level of growth of GDP in the economy. The
efficiency (and speed) with which wages respond to
changes in unemploymcnt is determined by the combi-
nation of strucnrral factors and failures in the labour and
product markeB. The rate of change of wages will event-
ually respond to the change in unemployment but lhe
process of adjustment may take some time. Empirical
evidence suggerc that the process of adjustment in the
United Kingdom has been slow in the past.
Empirical estimates of the level of the NAIRU are sub-
ject to considerable uncertainry, are often unstable when
tested and depend heavily upon the specificationof wage
determination in any particular model. However, the
concept of the NAIRU has been an important influence
upon labour market policy in the United Kingdom and
therefore upon policy measures taken to improve the
flexibility of real wag€s. In fact, legislative and policy
initiatives in the United Kingdom have brought about
considerable reform in labour and product markets dur-
ing the past decade. The level of the NAIRU should now
be much lower than during the period of the early- to
mid-1980's. However, the NAIRU is also higher than the
levels of unemploymentrecorded in 1990. The following
investigates further the ways in which wages are deter-
mined in the United Kingdom and looks particularly at
the structural factors and failures which are the founda-
tions of the principle of the NAIRU. It reviews some of
the details of stnrctural reform and looks at the important
structural problems which remain in place. It concludes
with an assessment of the short-term prospects for wages
and prices.
1. Models of wage determination
Recent empirical work has attemptcd to explain the path
of real wages in the United Kingdom by reference to
models of collective bargaining la. The models are based
upon a 'cost-plus'system of pricing, where costs are
dominated by wages and import prices. The rate of in-
crease in nominal wages is the outcome of a compromise
between firms and workers. Workers (perhaps repre-
sented by unions) are concerned to add a mark-up to
prices when determining wages and firms are concerned
to add a mark-up to wage costs when setting prices.
Firms and unions must bear in mind the rate of growth
of domestic demand and the condition of the labour
market. Firms and unions will naturally refer to the level
of profits when striking a bargain.
14) Sec, for exanrplg layrd and Nickell (1985). The &tailed refercnoe is at the cnd of the texr
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The bargaining models thereby describe a relationship
between pricing behaviour and unemployment. The rate
of change of unemployment influences the willingness
of firrns to concede wage increases and the strength of
trade unions to enforce them. The more recent empirical
developments propose that there is one level of unem-
ployment which is consistent with stable prices, and this
is the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU). The level of the NAIRU is observed ro vary
dramatically across countries. The remarkable feature of
the 1970's and 1980's is the very large increase in the
NAIRU in the United Kingdom, and indeed in the Euro-
pean Community. The increase in the NAIRU in the
United Kingdom was particularly concentrated into the
period from 1981 to 1983 but the higher level of unem-
ployment persisted until 1986.
Analytical and empirical work has sought to explain the
level of the NAIRU by reference to the supply-side of
the labour market. The explanation and measurement of
the level of the NAIRU is particularly difficult. How-
ever, there are certain factors which may improve the
capacity of those in work to bring about a step increase
in their real wages through some structural failure or
change on the supply-side of the labour market. The
principal factors are:
. Mismatch, which implies that an important part of the
available labour supply is unattractive to employ,
given the state of technology and the potential produc-
tivity of that labour,
. Job search, where the unemployed (or potential em-
ployed) search less hard for work, perhaps because
unemploympent benefits have become more generous
(the reservation wage has risen) or because of discour-
agement amongst the unemployed at the difficulties of
gaining access to work,
. Legislative failure, where employment legislation
(perhaps relating to hiring and firing procedures) is
changed and alters the balance ofpower in the labour
market, leading to changes in firms' willingness to
recruit and changes in their production methods, and
. Union militancy, where workers decide that circum-
stances have changed and an opportunity has appeared
for introducing a trend change in the distribution of
national income towards wages. The strength of union
militancy may be altered by changes in labour legisla-
tion.
The combination and strength of these factors also deter-
mines the ability of workers to resist a reduction in the
net real wage when 'shocks'appear. Primary examples
of 'shocks'include:
. Taxes, where rising taxes (perhaps community charge
or even mortgage costs) lead to a demand for compen-
sating increases in nominal wages,
. Relative import prices, where the underlying trend in
the price of imports is raised relarive to the price of
final domestic output, leading to a rise in the price of
final domestic output relative to value-added, and
. A productivity slowdown, where the trend rate of
growth of productivity turns down (for whatever rea-
son) and the consequences for wage growth are re-
sisted. Nominal wages sustain their previous path.
In the medium-term, the effect of these structural factors
or failures is to shift the relationship between real wages
growth and productivity in favour of real wages for those
in work. The following examines the circumstances
which enable this shift to be achieved in practice.
2. 'rlnsider - outsiderff and hysteresis
The manner and circumstances in which workers
(unions) are able to impose upward movements in the
real wage, or resist downward pressures upon the real
wage, has been the subject ofsophisticated analysis. The
most convincing explanations are based upon develop-
ments of the "insider-outsider" models of the labour
market,
In these models, unions select the wage by virtue of their
"insider" power and firms choose the number of workers
they will employ. "Insiders" will encourage the recruit-
ment of "outsiders" only for as long as additional recruit-
ment adds to the marginal revenue product of those in
work. "Outsiders" will be willing to enter work provided
the expected marginal revenue product exceeds the
reservation wage, measured by the level of out-of-work
income. "Insiders" will exercise and maintain their
power by constructing rules and codes which can be used
to restrict access and raise labour turnover costs for
firms. Power may very well be exerciced through trade
unions, but this is not a necessary condition. The pos-
session of power may be supported by the complexity of
production techniques inside the enterprise (and the as-
sociated complexity of skills) or power may be won by
the formation of informal coalitions among those with
higher or professional skills.
The incentive to exclude "outsiders" is enhanced if "out-
siders" have lower order skills and abilities compared to
"insiders". "Insiders" will then prefer to maintain bar-
riers to employment and capture for themselves the ad-
ditional rent from future increases in profits. The
situation will be sustainable provided firms are willing
to negotiate only with "insiders". However, firms may
be quite willing to deal only with "insiders" because
recruitment of "outsiders" has certain risks of failure
(choosing the wrong workers) and they may prefer to
maintain good relations with the highly-skilled (and
more productive) "insiders". The outcome is consistent
with behaviour which finds firms preferring to invest in
labour-saving capital equipment rather than recruit new
workers, and being encouraged to do so by "insiders"
because the benefits for their "insider" revenue product
(and subsequent real wages) are superior. The potential
for "insider" behaviour will be further enhanced where
firms are operating in oligopolistic or monopolistic mar-
kets, because firms will then have fewer incentives to
resist the construction of barriers to "insider" entry and
will be able to pass on cost pressures in higher product
prices. In fact, "insiders" will have still further incen-
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tives to erect barriers (and capture economic rent) where
product markets are subject to restricted competition
because their bargaining strategy is also subject to fewer
constraints.
Separate analysis has claimed to find evidence of hys-
teresis in the labour market. Hysteresis might be seen to
occur when the labour market establishes equilibrium at
a given level of unemployment and then (ceteris paribus)
maintains that equilibrium level of unemployment into
tt e future. However, the equilibrium level of unemploy-
ment which is established is in no sense unique and there
are various (perhaps numerous) levels of unemployment
which might be consistent with a similar path of real
wages. History then matters and the best explanation of
current levels of unemployment is past levels of unem-
ployment. The implication is that rates of change, rather
than any particular level, of unemployment influences
real wages, Thchysteresis proposition is at least partly
consistent with the "insider-outsider" model of the la-
bour market. In the specific case of the United Kingdom,
hysteresis could be said to be gestating during the 1970s
when the rate of technological adjustment to changes in
the structure of demand and prices on world markets was
delayed by various changes in industrial and labour
market policy. The "shock" of the change in inflation
regime at the beginning of the 1980s led to a widespread
release of labour (and abandonment of capital) and a
very fast rise in unemployment. The rise in unemploy-
ment was so fast that the labour market was unable to
cope with the required adjustment. Unemployment was
then locked in at the higher level by malfunctions in
labour and product markets.
The explanation for the failure of real wages to respond
to the high levels of unemployment is nevertheless in-
complete. The important, remaining questions are why
"outsiders" fail to approach firms directly and why they
do not set up new businesses in order to compete with
the "insiders". The answer to the first question might be
that firms delegate a component of screening costs of
new workers to "insiders", and "insiders" have incen-
tives to exclude many of the new applicants. The answer
to the second question may be that "outsiders" lack the
required skills and knowledge for forming coalitions
with other "outsiders" and may be unable or unwilling
to accept the risks inherent in forming new enterprises.
The rules, structure and generosity of the unemployment
benefit system may offer strong disincentives. The cre-
ation of new enterprises, or the adoption of innovative
working patterns which might enable re-entry to work,
may be discouraged by rules and regulations ("red tape")
and by codes of conduct constructed by "insiders". One
further problem is that access to capital markets for
"outsiders" may be restricted because of collateral re-
quirements and the associated risks attached to borrow-
ing. One final, and important, implication of hysteresis
is that the effects of unemployment on job-seekers are
cumulative and skills and motivation deteriorate with
duration of unemployment spell.
3. The significance of the structure of
collective bargaining
Otherresearch has adopted elements of both the "insider-
outsider" and hysteresis proposals and asserted (with
dubious empirical suppqf) that institutional features in
the bargaining system " -"y lead to failures in the
adjustment of real wages to particular levels of unem-
ployment and that these failures miy be durable. The
United Kingdom is judged to have a systcm of collective
bargaining which combines both elements of national
and decentralised bargaining. The analysis supposes that
bargainers work within a 'Prisoner's Dilemma'and that
nominal wages are determined by reference to labour
market conditions in the regions, or local labour rparkets,
of the United Kingdom which are cxperie4cing thg most
buoyant conditions. Nominal wage incrgases are then
transmitted throughout labour markets in low activity
regions. The rigidity of wage determination is empha-
sised by failures of labour mobility made worse by in-
flexibilities in the housing market. The inflexible
housing market is encouraged by tax-incentives for
owner-occupation and a poorlydeveloped rental sector.
The proposition is extended by the notion that high
levels of owner{rccupation have encouraged an infla-
tionary psychology in the United Kingdom, because
housing is used as a major store of personal wealth.
The inefficiencies imposed by the structure of collective
bargaining will be magnified by failures in expectations
regarding the future path of domestic demand and infla-
tion. Inflation surprises will be resisted in wage determi-
nation in the high activity regions or labour markets and
these will again be transmitted across all labour markets.
Failure by the monetary authorities to implement the
stated path of the Medium-Term Financial Strategy will
encourage forward-looking settlements which attempt to
anticipate the path of inflation in the determination of
real wages, thereby cultivating an inflationary attitude
in economic life. The persistence of inflationary expec-
tations (or the presumption that growth in nominal in-
comes will inevitably be faster than predicted in the
MTFS) combined with inefficiencies in the hybrid sys-
tem of collective bargaining will also substantially delay
the speed of adjustment of real wages to changes in the
rate of growth of economic activity.
15) See, for example, Calmfors and Driffrll (1988). The uncertafurties anached to the empirical wuk relate prirrcipally o the
judgements required to obtain a satisfactry description of the prevalent system of collective bargaining in any prticular
country.
(4)
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4. The recent behaviour of real wages and
unemployment
Real post-tax wages and salaries were falling between
1980 and 1982, as uuemployment increased from 1,074
million to 2,700 million. Real post-tax wages and sa-
laries then increased st an accelerating rate through to
1988, in which year the increase was about 7 w%.
Measured unemployment continued to increase through
to 1986, where it peaked at 3,133 million. Unemploy-
ment then fell dramatically from 1986 to 1990, reaching
a low point of 1,604 million in March 1990. Unemploy-
ment has now begun to rise. The annual rate of increase
in real post-tax wages and salaries has been declining
from the peak of 7 w% in 1988 and is now averaging
tbout 2?o. One interesting feature of the data is that the
rate of increase in real post-tax wages and salaries has
been declining during a period when unemployment has
been falling steeply, in contrast to a period between 1982
and 1986 when real post-tax pay was rising rapidly when
unemployment was also rising.
Further analysis of the trend in the data, from 1987 to
1989, shows that the r€spons€ from cmploSrment to the
acceleration in economic activity was much more im-
pressive when compared with earlier periods of expan-
sion. Increases in employment will naturally lag
expansions in output which explains why large improve-
ments in productivity appeared in 1987 and 1988 but
then began to disappear as employment rose more rapid-
ly and as trends in nominal wages moved gradually
upwards. Nevertheless, the rate of increase in nominal
wages appears remarkably modest in comparison to the
rate at which unemployment fell during the period from
1986 to 1989.
The final important feature in the data is that the rate of
increase in real wages compared to productivity trcnd
has changed substantially during the most recent decade.
The improvement in productivity performance relative
to real wages growth explains the underlying improve-
ment in the proportion of national income appearing as
profits. The present slowdown in the rate of growth of
output is putting considerable upward pressure on unit
labour costs and downward pressure on profit margins.
However, the decline in net profit margins is a compara-
tively recent event and only began in earnest in the
Autumn of 1989 and in the first half of 1990.
5. Has the supply-side of the labour market
changed?
Models of wage determination continue to be basedupon
an inverse relationship between the rate of change of
unemployment and the rate of change of nominal wages.
However, the problem in modelling wage determination
is to estimate the level of unemployment at which in-
creases in nominal wages will begin to moderate. The
earlier review describes how recent research into the
supply-side of the labour market has sought to explain
the NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Un-
employment) by reference to 'insider-outsider" phe-
nomena and hysteresis. The broad implication of this
research is that the level of unemployment at which
nomind wrge increases will begin to moderate is deter-
mined by r series of stnrctural factors or failures. Struc-
tural factors or failures enable the most productive of
those in work to organise the conduct of business in a
way which provides substantial economic rents for them-
selves.
The thrust of government policy for the labour market
has been consistent with (and heavily influenced by) this
view of the world. Wide-ranging reforms and intitiatives
have been introduced, many of which are intended to
strengthen the competitive position of "outsiders". The
initiatives have aimed to:
. build "bridges" between the long-term unemployed
and employers, - raise the marginal revenue product of
"outsiders" through direct training prograrnmes,
. encourage the creation of new businesses to improve
product market competition,
. encouragc job search by reducing the generosity of
unemployemnt benefits, both by revising allowances
and by strengthening eligibility criteria,
. improve incentives to work through changes in the
structure of personal taxation, and
. stimulate the adoption of new and flexible working
Patterns.
The following describes the reforms and initiatives in
more detail.
Mlsmatch
The long-term unemployed have benefited substantially
from the fall in total unemployment since 1986 and it
seems probable that the Government's Restart Pro-
gramme has been an important influence. The Restart
Programme has attempted to establish direct links be-
tween firms and the longer-term unemployed, by syste-
matic interviewing of job-seekers and the provision of
self-help facilities through job clubs. Employment
Training has attempted to provide additional skill train-
ing to assist re-entry to work. One of the important
objectives of the Programme has been to reform the
attitud€s of both firms and job-seekers about the poten-
tial of the long-term unemployed to re-enter work. The
improvement in the structure of labour supply achieved
by the Programme is suggested by the unemployment-
vacancy ratio, which shows that levels of unemployment
consistent with given levels of notified vacancies have
fallen sharply since 1986. The change is represented by
a leftward movement of the u/v ratio since that year. It
is also noticcable thet overall measures of skill shortage
have been much lower than in previous periods of com-
parable acceleration in economic activity.
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Job search
The Restart Programme has been supported by changes
in the rules relating tounemploymentbenefit entitlement
and income support. The job-search criteria for the re-
ceipt of unemployment benefits have been strengthened
and now resemble arrangements in Scandinavia and
Switzerland. The rules relating to young people benefits
have also been tightened with a view to encouraging job
search or participation in further education and training
prograrnmes. The reorganisation of the administration of
unemployment benefits (the merging of the provision of
services in job matching and benefit payments) should
also be contributinS to an improvement in the speed of
job search and in the efficiency of the matching process.
Job search should also have been improved by revisions
to the personal tax and national insurance contribution
systerns, combined with changes to the structure of in-
and out-of-work State benefits through Income Support.
The benefits of improved job search appear not only in
lower unemployment but also as an improvement in
competition for jobs as (for example) the long-term un-
employed gain access to work and improve their longer-
term credentials in the eyes of recruitment agents.
Systems of pay bargalnlng and reward
Evidence has appeared of improving fleribility in pay
bargaining systems and a movement away from the in-
determinacy which is supposedly determinental to effi-
ciency in nominal wage determination. The evidence
appears in a fall in the numbers covered by industry-
level agreemenls, measured by the New Eamings Survey
and the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The
trend away from industry-level agreements (and towards
plant-level arangements) would be encouraged by the
break-up of the engineering industry agreement, al-
though the future of the engineering agreement remains
unclear. Increasing flexibility in regional pay determina-
tion is suggested by recent data which show that the
ordering of regions by pay levels is undergoing change
after prolonged rigidity. The rise of East Anglia, and the
relative fall of the North-West and Nonhern regions, are
necessary preludes to inter-regional adjustments. Evi-
dence also suggests that overall levels of pay now in-
clude greater elements for bonuses and profit-related
pay, and the extent of wage drift as an element in total
average eamings does appear to have fallen relatively
quickly during the recent period of deceleration in econ-
omic activity.
Improved productivlty trend
The suggestion of increasing flexibiliry in pay systems
is also associated with an increasing diversity of employ-
ment structures and working practices. Employment
legislation (and some direct Employment Measures)
have sought to provide the opportunity for the creation
of a wide range of pattems of working hours and the
major features have been a rise in part-time working,
self-employment and sub-contracting and changes in the
patterns of shift-working. Industrial relations legisla-
tion, during the past decade, should also have provided
the necessary framework for the adoption of better work-
ing practices and improved technology. Examples are the
abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme and the
adoption of new technology in the newspaper industry.
Thenew environment of industrial relations should have
contributed to a trend improvement in productivity with
enhanced wage moderation. Benefits from improve-
ments in the industrial relations framework will continue
to appear over several years, as new expectations are
formed and confirmed.
Unlon mllltancy and leglslation
The decline in union militancy during r€cent years (but
particularly since 1986) is one of the outstanding fea-
tures of the instiiutional framework of the labourmarket.
The 1988 Employment Act has continued the process by
increasing the accountability of trade union officials to
their members and removing legal immunity from strikes
which are called to support the closed shop. It also
repeals most legislation which discriminates between
males and females in employment matters. It has
removed working-time resuictions for young people,
and eases some of the rules concerning the release of
workers.
Small flrms
Competition in product markets (and the potential for
"outsiders" to re-enter the labour market) have been
encouraged by several initiatives. The structure of cor-
poration and value-added taxes has been amended. The
Business Expansion and [,oan Guarantee Schemes have
enabled an improvement in the financing of small busi-
nesses and the Business Development Initiative provides
support for consultancy and information systems for
small firms. Regional policy has also been reformed,
away from the previous systems of automatic grans and
subsidies and towards a system based on advice and
incentives. The opportunities for small businesses to
enter product markets have been promoted by the
freeing-up of competition for public sector projects and
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thc insistence on the introduction of competitivc bidding
and sub-contrrcting in the provision of locel aurhority
services.
6. Important rigidities remain in the
labour msrket
The review of evidence so far sugg$ts a significant
improvement in actual and potential supply-side perfor-
mance for recent and futrue yean. Nevcrtheless, OECD
estimates 16 for the period up to ttrc mid-1980's show
that the responsivcness ofrcal wages to changes in econ-
omic activity (proxied by the rato of change of unem-
ployment) is sluggish at best compared to thc major
industrial countrieg although not greatly inferior to many
of the EC Member States. The following reviews cvi-
dence for continuing rigidities and inefficiencies in the
labour market in the United Kingdom.
Educatlon and tralnlng
The new Training and Enterprise Councils sre an attempt
to raise employer commitment ge g'ainilg and education
and to improve their relevancc to the structure of needs
in local labour martets. The 1988 Education Reform Act
provides for fundamental changes in the wry young
people will bc prepared for working life, introducing a
common core curriculum with stronger emphasis on
work-related subjects and standardiscd assessments of
student progrcss. However, there arc considerable
doubts about the mrnner in which post-compulsory edu-
cation and training will be ecquired by 16 to 19 year-olds
and whethcr the facilities to deliver such educrtion and
training are avrilable, either inside or outside of Statc-
funded colleges. Evidence suggests that the average
quality of training inside the Youth Training Scheme
(delivercd principally inside thc firrr) has becn low and
it is unclear whether revisions through the new Youth
Training progranrme will be rn improvement. The resol-
ution of these issucs has considerablc implications for
the quality and flexibiliqr of labour suppln rnd for the
strength of competition in labour markets, both in the
immediate future but parlicularly in the long-run. The
experiment in voucher-funding for e percentage of
young people may be bcneficial, but such funding will
need to be supported by considerable improvements in
information available to young people and in the status
and priority whic\ young people attach to the acquisition
of education and training.
Collectlve bargalnlng and sklll dlfferentlals
Whilst statistical evidence is poor, the strong imprcssion
is that pay differentials for skill within important s€ctors
of industry are inadequatc to provide sufficient incen-
tivcs for participation in training and further education.
The problem of pay differentials also applies ro young
people, where young people's pay appears to be too high
to provide employers with incentives to train within thc
firm. Pay differentials for skill also provide few incen-
tives for young people to acquire new and higher abil-
ities upon their own initiative. The narrowness of
differentials is particularly evident when comparisons
are made rgainst countries op€rating the dual system of
youth uaiaing, such as Germany and Switzerland. The
compression of skill differentials in somc industries in
the United Kingdom is almost certainly associated with
insufficient occupational mobilitn which is the outcome
of excessive specialisation in formative education and
training, and the consequence of inllexibility in working
practices and patterns at some major workplaces. The
problem of young p€rson pay differentials has con-
uibuted to the decline of formal skill apprenticeships in
the United Kingdom, and the present Youth Training
arangements are unlikely to reverse that trend.
Geogrephlcel moblllty
There is evidence for a trend away from industry-level
bargaining but very little evidence for bargaining
founded upon conditions in local labour markets. How-
ever, the essentiel requirement for effective devolution
in pay bargaining (and pay flexibility in local labour
markets) is an improvement in occupational and geo-
graphical labour mobility. Immobility of labour is partly
the outcome of significant differences in regional
property prices, which magnify the significance of high
levels of owner-occupation. Regional differences in
houseprices are ettributable toregional imbalance in the
location ofhighervalue-added (and higher paid) activiry
and the effects that this imbalancehas upon regional land
values. The continuing absence of a rented scctor is a
firrther impediment to the freer movement of labour, but
aversion to renting is also associated with thc tax advant-
ages available for owner-occupation. The problems as-
sociated with labour immobility have appeared in severe
skill shortages in somc soctors, regions and occupations
as the rate of growth of economic activity has accel-
erated atrd approached a peak.
Competltlon ln product markets
Empirical evidence for the United Kingdom indicates a
strong association between levels of competition in pro-
duct markets and the responsiveness of real wages to
16) Refer, for exomple, to 0rc enqirical wort by Coe (soe 'Referenoes')
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changes in economic activity. Monopolistic elemcnB in
particular markets naturally indicate the speed with
which firms will moderate the rate of increase in their
prices when circumstances are changing. Th€ speed with
which imports entered the United Kingdom during the
years of peak growth in nominal incomes (1988 to 1989)
suggest a high degree of competition from foreign goods
across many ssctors. However, there are severd markets
where competition is restricted by domestic conditions
or where voluntary agreements with overseas producers
provide the foundation for 'insider'power to be exer-
cised within firms. Some major examples appear in
transport services, telecommunications and the motor
industry. Such problems are equally apparent across all
EC Member States.
7. Assessment of the prospects for wage
determination
The most rscent explanations of wage determination in
the United Kingdom continue to identify a relationship
between the rate of change of wages and the rate of
change of unemployment. The identification thereby in-
cludes a relationship between the rate of change of un-
employment and the rate of change of prices, because
wage costs exercis€ a dominant inlluence upon prices.
Structural factors and failures in labour and product
markets have important effects upon wage determina-
tion, because they moderate or nullify the benefits of
competition and present the opportuniries for upward
pressures upon real wages which are inconsistent with
trends in output per head. Structural factors or failures
also lead to inllexibilities in the real wage (real wage
resistance) when confronted with "shocks" which reduce
the rate of growth of output. The level of unemplo5rment
which is required to exert effective constraint upon the
path of wages and prices (the NAIRU) is rherefore deter-
mined in the structure of labour and product markets.
Extensive research has been undertaken, during the past
decade, into the extenr of real wage flexibility in the
United Kingdom. nlork ar OECD and the Cenrre for
Labour Economics (see 'References') suggests that real
wages have been relatively inflexible in the face of a rise
in unemployment and that significant losses of output
and employment will be required before inflationary
pressures in the labour market are moderated. The find-
ings can be compared with estimates which suggest that
the NAIRU in the United Kingdom, during the first half
of the 1980's, may have been in the rang e of lo?o-ll7or7 .
The evidence on the preseni state of flexibility in the uK
labour market is that important change has begun to
appear since about 1986, and that the NAIRU has by now
been significantly reduced. The responsiveness of real
wages to unemployment should have been improved by
the various legislativc changes and programmes which
have led to re-entry of an important part of the long+erm
unemploycd to work. The ease of access should also be
improvcd by the various reforms in industrial relations
which have enabled and encouraged changes in working
pettenrs and prrctices, end enabled the adoption ofnew
technology. The overall effect should be ur improvement
in the qualiry of labour rupply and the exrent of compe-
tition for jobs and cotrtracts for wck. The improvement
in the balance of power in labour and product markets,
bctween firms rnd workers'representatives rnd between
"insiders" and "outsiders", should also enable more rapid
adjustments in the rate of increase in unit labour costs.
The more effcctive adjustment should be supported by
greater flexibility in the compositon of pay rewards.
Greater competition in product markets, andparticularly
the entry of new firms, should be supported by initiatives
which have cncouraged the creation of new businesses
and the introduction of new competition in the provision
of public sector s€rvices.
The record of reforur is much less impressive in the
restructuring of collective bargaining. Public sector pay
bargaining systenuB have changed very little during the
past decade, although the intention to conlinue thc
decentralisation of Central Govemrnent into agencies
and into the regions should present much greater oppor-
tunities for bargaining reform. OECD ovidence shows
that the responsiveness of wage settlemenB to inllation
is much higher in the United Kingdom than in many
industrial countries and that responsiveness is assyme-
trical. Wage Bettlements therefore rcact v€ry slowly to a
falling rate of inllation butrespond muchmore vigorous-
ly to a rising rate ofinllation. The failurc to undertake a
more dctermined reform of collective bargaining is like-
ly to have left this inllationary psychology intact. Never-
theless, trends in the data for real post-tax wages present
grounds for optimism. The rate of increase in wages
during the period since 1985 has boen modest compared
against the rate of expansion of economic activity and
the size of thc fall in unemployment. The data also reveal
an improvement (during thc past decade) in the trend of
productivity growth against reat wages, leading to a
substantial rcvival in profits. The rate of increasc in real
post-tex wrges hrs been falling suberantially since 1988,
es inllation (measured by the rerail pricc index) has
accelerated whilst nominal wages have increased only
gradually.
The outlook for wage determination in the short-run is
as follows. lnflationary expectations have strengthened
as the retail prices index has accelerared and it will take
time for these expectations to moderate, and inlluence
bargaining behaviour. It will also rake time for revised
expectations to feed through into wage contract commit-
ments, unless contracts are subject to early revision. The
reforms so farundertaken in labour and product markets
should lead to a much better response from real wages
I 7) The figures reFesent a judgernent by the Commission Servkrs based upon tremds in t1s dnra 6f ffiation urd unenrpbyment
and the empirical *ork of Layard rrd Nickell IMF srd OECD (see 'Refererrces' at the end of ttre Armex).
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to the rate of change of unemployment, compared to
responsiveness in the first half of the last decade. How-
ever, the inflationary attitudes of bargainers (amongst
firms and workers) remain entrenched and this will con-
strain the speed of adjustment which can be expected in
the real wage. Earnings growth is unlikely to fall below
about 6 ta% (rounded) before the end of 1992. Under-
lying productivity growth is probably of the order of
2 w-39o and (if so) the underlying level of inflation is
likely to settle at about 4 tn?o (rounded) by the end of
the same year. The figures assume that firms anticipate
the present slowdown ineconomic activity to be relative-
ly short-lived and base their decision-making on me-
dium-term expectations for output growth. It is assumed
that firms will wish to maintain broadly their present
(trend) level of profits when negotiating pay settlements.
The judgement about prospects is based upon the view
that the NAIRU is now significantly lower than the
figure of LO-ll% established during the first half of the
1980's and is within the range of 7-8% on the intema-
tional definition of unemployment. Further improve-
ment in the responsiveness of wages to changes in
unemployment will require additional and substantial
improvements in the supply-side of the economy. The
relevant policy areas include education and training (and
particularly amongst 16-19 years-olds), more decisive
reform of collective bargaining and the improvement of
competition in particular product markets. The benefits
of further reform would emerge in the widening of re-
gional, occupational and skill differentials and an im-
provement in geographical mobility. The evidence
suggests that there is already some change appearing in
regional pay differentials but this process could be ac-
celerated by greater decentralisation of pay bargaining
into local labour markets and the continuing reform of
the owner-occupied and rented sectors of the housing
market. Widening of pay differentials for skill would
provide the appropriate environment for greater acquisi-
tion of education and training throughout the labour
force, which would make a major contribution to the
reduction of the NAIRU and enhance the responsiveness
of real wages to changes in unemployment.
REFERENCES
Alogoskoufis, G.S., and Manning, A. (1988), 'On the
persistence of unemployment', Economic Policy, Oc-
tober.
Bean, C.R., Layard, P.R.G., and Nickell, S.J., (1986),
'The rise in unemployment:a multi-country study',
Economic Supplement.
Blanchard, O. and Summers, L. (1986), 'Hysteresis and
the European Unemployment problem', NBER Macro-
economic Annual.
Calmfors, L. and Driffill, J., (1988), 'Bargaining Struc-
ture, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance',
Economic Policy, Number6.
Coe, D.T., (1985), 'Nominal Wages, the NAIRU and
Wage Flexibility', OECD Economic Studies, No. 5.
Fisher, P.G., Turner D.S., Wallis, K.F. and Whitley, D.J.
(1990), 'Comparative properties of Models of the UK
Economy', National Institute Economic Review', Num-
berl33.
International Monetary Fund (1987), "World Economic
Outlook", Staff Studies.
Layard, P.R.G. and Nickell, S.J. (1985), 'The Causes of
British Unemployment', National Institute Economic
Review, No. lll.
Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D. (1985), 'Explanations of
Unemployment', Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D. (1988), 'Co-operation,
Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment:An In-
sider-Outsider Hypothesis', American Economic Re-
view, vol.78.
Stewart, M. (1989), 'Union Wage Differentials, Product
Market Influences and the Division of Rents', University
of Warwick.
The Balance of Paymenb and International Transactions of the UK in the 1980s 25
Chapter 2
The Balance of Payments and
International Tbansactions of the UK in
the 1980s
l. Introduction
The UK's balance on external balance over the past thirty
years has fluctuated between deficit and surplus accord-
ing to movements in domestic demand relative to domes-
tic output. The presont annex reviews the evolution of
the external transections of the UK, particularly with
reference to the decade of the 1980s when major struc-
tural reforms have taken place. These reforms have af-
fected capital account transactions. The easing of
constraints on domestic and international financial ac-
tivities has also influenced the pattern of domestic
spending, and, therefore, the country's external balance.
Furthermore, the removal of exchange controls in 1979
and the financial innovations of the 1980s has made
intermediation of domestic and international capital
more efficient, and the financing of balance of payments
deficits possible without large and disruptive exchange
rate adjusunents.
Graph 2.1 shows the evolution of the current account
balance as percent of GDP over the Past twenty ysars.
The balance has recorded large deficits in periods of
reflation, 1974 and in the late 1980s, while in the periods
of deflation of the early 1970s and 1980s the external
accounts have moved into sizeable surpluses. Also,
during periods of demand changes the balance of pay-
ments has rapidly moved in the opposite direction.
The overall balance on international transactions masks
important differences in the evolution of specific ac-
counts. Thus, growing deficits in some categories of
goods and services have coexisted with growing
surpluses in others. Underlying these developments are
changes in the country's ability to compete intemation-
ally, changes in tastes, changes in institutional regula-
Graph 2.1
tions, and changes in incomes. While the aggregate state
of the balance of payments is a principal indicator of
macrocconomic disequilibrium, developments in in-
dividual items of the balance of paymcnts offer a more
microeconomic view of the adjustment process. In an
open economy these developments are directly to related
trends in employment and, ultimately, to the country's
standards of living.
2. Merchandise trade and invisibles
2.1 Vlslble trade
The visible trade balance represents the principal item
of the balance of payments. It has uaditionally been in
deficit with the exception of periods of deflation. The
deficit peaked at a record value of close to UKL 24
billion in 1989 in the course of the recent cycle. Mer-
chandise transactions are the the most income-elastic
component of a country's international transactions and,
as a result, are very responsive to changes in the levels
of economic activity at home and abroad; in addition,
they display smaller but, nevertheless sizeable, elas-
ticities with respect to price changes, making ir possible
for exchange rate changes to contribute to balance of
payments adjustment.
Table 2.1 presents key data on UK's international trans-
actions during the 1980s. It is evident that the current
account deterioration during this period is accounted
principally by the worsened deficit on visible trade.
Movements in visible trade contain a cyclical and a
secular element. The cyclical compoment is essentially
the dominant factor in changes in the balance, as well as
in changes in the current account balance. Cyclical
movements in the world economy relative to the UK
contribute to raising UK exports above trend. It is dif-
ficult to evaluate the elesticity of export supply with
respect to movements in world incomes and prices. How-
cver, the evidence from the different cyclical positions
of the UK relative to the rest of the world in the late
Current qccount, visible trode
and invisible balcnce
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Tebte 2.1 Vlslble, Invlslble, end Current Account
Brlence (UKL bllllon)
1980 1985 t987 1988 1989 l99G
YlslHeTrede 1,36 -3,35 -llP, -2l,lo -23,U -1795
ServlceBdaace 3.65 6,69 6,63 4,50 4,7O 3,12
IPDBdence -0.18 2,51 3,68 4,79 4,10 2,14
TrrosfersBdeoce -1.98 -3,11 -3,,10 -?,55 -4,58 -3,?9
InvlCblerBrlrnce 1,49 6,09 6,91 5,74 432 1,88
CurrentAccqrnt e85 2J4 -4,31 -536 -19,A -16,W
Belorc'lngltem OPZ 7,O7 -O,U 7,@ 15,69 na
' 
Provisionah
s.a. invisibler dete are for Ql-Q3 - only the invisibler balance
in Q4 ir projccted rt z€ro.
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1980s suggests that these supply elesticities can be size-
able especially when domestic demand is slowing down;
in these circumstances export availability increases.
There is also evidence that the supply potential of UK
manufactures has increased substantiallv as a result of
the supply-side reforms of the 1980s ls.
The quantitative responsivess of imports to changes in
domestic demand and prices has increased over time,
reflecting the greater openness of the UK economy and
its progressive integration into world trade, and especial-
ly irc integration with the other European Community
countries. Elasticities of UK merchandise imports with
respect to domestic expenditure have been estimated
over the period 1980-1988, as well as over other
samples, and some results are reported in Table 2.2. Seen
in historical perspective, the short-run elasticity of im-
ports with respect to the ratio of import to domestic
prices in the 1980s has doubled compared to the previous
twenty years; similarly, the long-run elasricity is twice
as large as in the previous two decades.
The composition of domestic demand is also an influen-
tial element in the structure and responsiveness of im-
ports.The result of the table suggest that an one perccnt
change in total domestic expenditure causes imports to
increase by 0,9 of one perccnt in the short-run, and by
1,8 percent in the long-run. Again, these estimates are
considerably higher in this decade compared to the pre-
vious two. Howcver, these responses are not identical
across categories of domestic spending. lmport demand
with respect to private corurumption displays the largest
elasticity (0,724 in the long-run), followed by exports of
goods (0,502), and by changes in stocks (0,462); the
response of imports to investment activity appears to be
of lesser importance (0,181). These estimates indicate
that export activity is import-intensive and, consequent-
ly, an increase in exports will be accompanied by a
substantial increase in imports, and the net effect on the
balance of payments will be much less when this inter-
dependence is taken into account.
The data reported in the table provide an explanation for
the rapid deterioration of the visible trade and current
account balance in the course of the current cycle. Un-
derlying this development is primarily the strength in
consumption growth; while investment activity has also
been buoyant, it contributes substantially less to import
demand and to the deficit. In view of the relatively low
price elasticities, is is clear that an improvement in the
current account and visible trade deficit is contingent
upon the extent to which growth in domestic demand will
be contained.
A closer examination of the pattern of merchandise
trade reveals an apparent secular decline in the ability of
the IJK to compete in markets for highly income elastic
products. These are products intensive in technology and
human capital, and, consequently, closely correlated
with high incomes. During the past thirty years the UK
has recorded increasing deficits in manufactures and
semi-manufactures, as well as in chemicals and
machinery and transport equipment. The observed pat-
tern of the countr5l's international trade provides an
indication of the changing comparative advantage,
without recourse to the unobservable deeper structural
parameters (production and tastes) which determine the
Table 2.22 Prlce end Expendlture Elestlcltles ol UK
Imports of Goods ln the 19E0s
Short-mn Long-nrn
RelatlvePrlce -0,218 4,425
Total kperdlture 0,9m 1,758
PrlvateCoosumptlon 0,4,18 O,lU
Totallnvestrnen, O,rr, 0,181
tr)xports of Goods 0,311 O,5A2
Inventorlesr 0,26 0,62
Source: Commission services.
I this is a semi-elasticity
Trble 23: The Reverled Comptrrtlve Adventrge
olthe IJK
SITCGmUp
Average l9El/E9
Wodd EC-ll Restof
theWorld
0. Food -0,43 -0,36 45t
1. Beverages and Tobrrco O,l7 -0,?n 055
2. Crude lltatedals -0,45 0,01 -0,69
3. Fuel koducls 0,19 0,63 -0,18
4. Ollq Fets end l{axec -0,60 4,49 -O,74
S.Chemlcals 0,09 -0,09 032
6.llfianullrc'tures -0,16 -0,19 -0,14
T.Machlnery/fransport -0,05 4'22 0,08
t. Mlscdlaneouslltanufac,tures {,15 -0,1E -0,13
Source: Calcularcd from Eurostat (19E9):'Extemal Trade'.
Yearbook 1989, Tablc 7;
and Eurostat (1990): 'Extemal Trade". Monthly Statistics,
611990, Table E.
18) See, for example, M.l,srdesmann ard A.Snell (1989): 'The Conseqtrenoes of Mrs. Thatcher for U.K. Manufacnying
Exports", Economic Journal, Much.
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character of trade. An index of the UK's revealed com-
parative advantage in the 1980s is reported in Table 2.3.
The index is the ratio 19 :
h 
= 
(xOJ) . M0J)XX(U) + M(U))
where X = exports, M = imports, i = commodity, I =
country. The index isboundedbetween -l and 1. Positive
values represent a surplus, and negative values a deficit,
position. The data suggest that, during the 1980s, theUK
had a comparative advantage in Beverages and Tobacco
products and in Chemicals vis-a-vis the world. However,
in its trade with the EC-ll the UK is competitive only in
SITC Groups 2 and 3, Crude Materials and Fuel Pro-
ducts. In its trade with the rest of the world the UK has
a comparative advantage in the commodity categories as
in its global trade.
The surplus on Fuel products is related to North Sea oil
production. Net oil exports have contributed substan-
tially to the current account Perfornance, particularly in
the early 1980s, and are the principal factor behind the
current account surpluses of that period, when the real
exchange rate appreciated sharply against the rest ofthe
world. It is unlikely that the surplus would have emerged
in the context of that appreciation, i.e., without oil. This
suggests that it was possible to pursue a disinflation
policy based on real exchange appreciation because the
oil surplus cushioned the current account position; in its
absence, the incipient current account deficit would have
led to a rapid exchrnge depreciation and would have
rendered an exchange rate-based disinflation, and per-
haps the complete disinflationary strategy, very difficult
to sustain.
A more interesting comparison is the evolution of the
revealed comparative advantage over time. In the 1960s
the UK recorded surpluses in SITC categories 1, and 5
to 8, in its world trade. These surpluses were also re-
corded in its EC-l1 trade, except for Miscellaneous
Manufactures. In the next decade the comparative ad-
vantage in Manufacnrres was eroded while the deficit in
Mi scell aneous Manufactures widened. Quite surprising-
ln the disadvantage in Food improved. The key charac-
teristic of this period is the decline in the comparative
advantage in Manufactures, Machinery and Transport
Equipment, and Miscellaneous Manufactures; the sur-
plus in Chemicals was, however, sustained. In the decade
of the 1980s the UK reveals a substantial decline in is
ability to compete in those product categories which
require technologically advanced methods of produc-
tion, and are also highly human-capital intensive. This
decline has occurred despite improvemens in the supply
side of the economy which has raised the economy's
ability to supply exportables in the 1980s.
The EC-l I is becoming the UK's dominant trade parmer,
accounting for 50,3% of LIK exports' and for 52,69o of
UK imports, in 1989. Even though the emerging pattern
of specialization raises questions about the country's
prospective competitiveness, it is likely that the single
market will benefit the supply of UK exportables, and
especially manufactures, in a wider and more closely
integrated Europe.
2.2 Invlslbles
The balance on invisibles has historically been in sur-
plus. This surplus has risen over the 1980s to a peak of
t KL 9,4 bitlion in 1986, but has subsequently declined
considerably. Of the three constituent balances, net
transfers have historically recorded deficits, while the
balance on interest, profits, and dividends (IPD) has,
except in 1980, been in surplus. The service balance has
remained in continuous surplus over the period'
International service activities covered by the accounts
include two principal components, travel and financial
services; also included separately are sea transport and
civil aviation and government transactions.
The travel balance has fluctuated between surpluses and
deficits in a manner reflecting the state of the interna-
tional business cycle. In addition, these transactions are
price-elastic to some important extent, and exchange
rate changes are contributing factors in the-recorded
swings. In recent years the travel balance has moved into
a sizeable deficit which peaked at close to UKL 2,5
billion in 1989.
The growing surplus on transactions in financial services
is largely a reflection of London's prominence as a fin-
ancial center. The surplus was UKL 9,5 billion in 1987;
this was three times as large as the surplus in the late
1970s. The largest single component of the balance re-
lates to financial transactions, which have produced over
5O% of the financial services surplus through activities
offinancial and related institutions. This balance peaked
at a surplus of UKL 5,5 billion in 1987.
The rapid buildup of surpluses on the IPD account came
to a halt in the late 1980s. This balance records net
carnings on international investment and on other finan-
cial transactions. These surpluses provided an offsetting
element to the rising deficits in merchandisc trade over
the 1980s, but their size declined after the peak of UKL
4,9 billion in 1988. Changes in the IPD balance reflect
primarily the influence of two developments: first,
changes in domestic relative to foreign profitability, and,
secondln changes in the rate of return and in the stock
of nct international indebtedness. A third and more dif-
19) See, for example, the use of ttris in&x in B3alassa and M.Noland (1989): 'The Changing Compuative Advantage of Japan
and the United States", Journal of the Japanese urd Intemational Economies, June.
(5)
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Teble 2.4: The CIty's Ne! Invlslble Eernlngs
(UKL bllllon)
1980 1985 1988 1989
Insurance
Banklng
Investmnt Trusts.
Brokerage etcEarnlngs
Other
Total Net Recdpte
I,r0
0,14
0,20
050
0,14
2,08
3,n
LN
0,94
0,82
o,26
6,56
490
2,t9
I,l0
0,82
060
9,61
4,64
r25
082
0,83
I,16
8,71
352
0,78
0,89
1,04
1,13
736
293
-0,68
1,42
r2s
rfi
6,18
Sourca CSO (1990): "The City'r Invisible Eamings in l9E9",l/10/1990:
* net income of invcatment trusts, unit tnrsts, and pension funds
ficult factor to observe is changes in expectations about
currency movements; these affect the timing of conver-
sion of foreign-curency earnings into sterling,
Net eamings on direct investment transactions peaked at
UKL 8,0 billion in 1989. In addition, the increase in net
capital inflows to finance the large current account
deficit of the previous three years, and the high interest
rates in the UK, have contributed to the weakening in the
balance on IPD. Thus, net earnings on portfolio invest-
ment peaked at UKL 3,2 billion in 1985, prior to the
emergence of the large curent account deficits and of
the current high interest rates. During the latter part of
the 1980s there has also occurred a decline in the UK's
net asset position related to domestic banks' interna-
tional transactions.
The balance on invisibles records realized flows ofnon-
merchandize eamings which arise from the country's net
international investment position. The recorded flows do
not take account of increases in the value of the country's
net international investment arising from capital gains.
This, according to Pratten zu, distorts the recorded bal-
ance on invisibles and overestimates the deficit on the
balance of payments. Consequently, the balance of pay-
ments difficulties are stricrly liquidity problems, while
the potential balance of payments position is more than
offset by the flow of capital gains. Nevertheless, the
pronounced decline in the surplus on invisibles is an
important determinant of the increased current account
financing requirements in recent years.
Data on the role of the City in international financial
transactions is shown in Table 2.4. The principal sources
ofearnings from international activities are provision of
services and receipts from investments in the form of
interest, dividends, and profits. The institutions involved
are insurance companies, banks, investment manage-
ment offices, and brokerage firms. Of these, insurance
firms are the dominant actors in terms of size of net
receipts. Total net receipts of all the identified institu-
tions peaked at IIKL 9,61 billion in 1986. In subsequent
years net receipts have declined, reflecting primarily a
lower surplus on insurance transactions.
The key contributor to the deficit on the balance of
transfers is the government's contributions and subscrip-
tions to international organizations, bilateral aid, and
other grants. Private transfers represent a small amount
in the total and there are no discernible trends in these
transactions. Although the deficit on transfers is si-
zeable, it receives little economic attention.
2.3 Errors and omlsslons ln the balance
of payments
An important development in the balance of payments
accounts in the 1980s has been the increase in the size
of the residual item, shown as the balancing item in Table
2.1. This item, which fluctuated between the equivalent
ofnet credit and net debit over much of the 1970s, has
been the equivalent of a ner debit since 1976, with the
exception of 1982 when a net credit was recorded. Its
size has increased to an unprecedented extent in the
period following the 1986 "big bang" financial reforms,
as can be seen from Table 2.1. It is, clearly, difficult to
attempt to evaluate developments in recorded current
account transactions when the residual estimate threa-
tens to dwarf these data.
Difficulties with balance of payments accounts are not
unique to the UK. During much of the posr-1973 period,
with the advent of generalized floating, industrial coun-
tries have recorded sizeable residuals in their interna-
tional transactions, and the world trade discrepancy
recorded in the early 1980s raised questions about the
quality of, and the method used in collecting, the data.
As Table 2.5 shows, throughout the 1980s several indus-
trial countries encountered balance of payments resid-
uals which, unlike the previous decade, have been
systematically of the same sign; i.e., either consistently
a credit item, representing the equivalent of a capital
20) See C.Pranen: "Capital Gains ard tlre Balarrce of Paymens", Deprtrnent of Applied Eoonomics, University of Cambridge,
manuscript, no date.
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Teble 25: Net Errors end Omlsslons: Selected Countrles
(UKL bllllon)
1980 1987 1988 1989
Cenada
France
Germany
Italy
UnltedKlngdom
Unlted States
-1,01
2,28
-1,20
4,38
t.t2
25,O1
-4,9?
0,65
2,03
2,35
7,48
23,81
-453
oag
3,09
-3,99
693$,n
-2,29
0,81
2,@
-1,55
20,10
1r.29
-2,28
0,85
033
-2-6
12.6
1,88
-1,59
0,94
2,44
-069
16,94
-8,30
-2,40
-2,94
233
na
24,55
22,@
Source: IFS, country lme77e.d; n. = not availablc
outflow (Canada and Italy), or consistently a debit item
representing the equivalent of a capital inflow (mostly
all the other countries shown in the table). What is
striking, however, is the increase in the size of the
residual in UK's accounts following the implementation
of financial reforms of the early 1980s and, in particular,
after the 1986 "big bang" reforms. The United States is
another case where the emergence of systematic and
large net errors and omissions has coincided with domes-
tic financial reforms. ln view of the fact that the UK and
the US have financial systems which are more highly
developed and have been subject to greater liberalization
reforms compared to the other countries, a large com-
ponent of the balancing item is likely related to financial
flows.
Evidence from other countries suggests that the residual
item is highly correlated with the net foreign asset posi-
tion of domestic banks, and is also related to the trade
balance. In addition, service transactions are potentially
another area where underrecordinS may exist. These
correlations indicate that, while it is possible to treat the
balance of payments residual item as the equivalent of a
capital inllow or outflow, this is not entirely correct. The
asymmetry in the timing of international trade receipts
and payments is also an important factor contributing to
the difficulties in properly covering and measuring in-
ternational transactions. However, this asymmetry prob-
lem should not be a permanent feature of the accounts,
because such positive errors in the current period should
be unwound in the next. It is very difficult to see if the
UK data are consistent with this because the aggregate
errors mask such details.
The meaningfulness and reliability of recorded interna-
tional transactions is undermined by the large balancing
item. In this respect, statistics on external transactions
present similar inadequacies as other official statistics in
recent years.
3. The capital account
Capital account transactions of the UK have undergone
changes in the I 980s, reflecting the removal of exchange
controls and the financial and regulatory innovations
during the decade. The removal of exchange controls,
implemented in 1979, were a pioneering example of the
liberalization pursued in subsequent years by other EC
countries. The financial reforms of the following years
widened the portfolio choice of UK residents vis-a-vis
the rest of the world and reduced the costs of intemation-
al financial transactions. Consequently, the role of Lon-
don in international financial intermediation has been
enhanced.
An outstanding feature of the capital account is the large
size of gross flows recorded in recent y€ars. The data
presented in Table A6 reveal the increased importance of
particular capital account transactions in the 1980s.
Thus, as a result of the removal of exchange controls,
direct and portfolio investment activities have
flourished. In the pre-1979 regime a variety of restric-
tions inhibited these categories of financial transactions
and the size of these investment flows was relatively
small. By contrast, the flows recorded in the 1980s indi-
cate that UK's financial markets have become closely
integrated with world financial activity.
The balance on direct investment flows deteriorated
sharply in the 1980s. Direct investment activity by UK
residents has become the dominant feature of these
flows; a record outflow of UKL 20,7 billion was
recorded in 1988. Direct investment in the IIK by over-
seas residents has also risen during these years; direct
investment inflows peaked in 1989 at UKL 18,3 billion.
The balance on direct investment transactious has posted
an unprecedented deterioration during the current
decade, compared to a virtual balance over the period
under the regime of exchange controls. However, in the
first half of 1990 a net inflow was recorded in this
account.
Transactions in portfolio investment have also under-
gone significant changes in the past ten years. Since
1979 the flows recorded under this category increased to
an unprecedented extent. For example, the mean value
of portfolio investment by lIK residents abroad over the
1970s is an outflow of LJKL 169,1 million; in the 1980s,
the mean outflow is in the range of UKL 12 billion. The
outflow on foreign securities transactions by UK resi-
dents peaked at UKL 36,8 billion in 1989. An exception
to this pattern is the inflow recorded in 1987 which was
related to the stock market crash late that year.
Inflows of foreign capital on portfolio transactions have
increased over the past ten years, in contrast to the
experience of the 1970s. These inflows have risen sub-
stantially in the second half of the 1980s but, in general,
remain lower than the capital outflows from purchases
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Teble 2.6: Prlnclpel cepltel eccount trrnsrctlons
(UKL Bllllon)
1985 Q3Q2t9t7 198t 1989 Qr
Dircctlnvestmrt
In theUK
Abroad
Portfollolnvestment
In the UK
Abrcad
Net Bank Cumency Tiensactlons
Sterllng
Depooltsetc
Borrowlng
Reserves
Net
Capltal Flows
3,865 8681 9,218
-8,465 -19,198 -20,685
o,26
FordgnCurreocy 0,669
UK non-Bank Tronsadlons wlth Banks Abroad
4,355
4,%7
1,431
-3310
-23fi
-0,137
-0,291
8,913
-19,426
-1,442
2,76
-lJ5E
18,408
-t9393
to.w
-35,897
7,195
7,576
-9,388
17,43
5,439
7,721
4,4y2
0,582
-2,232
3,883
-o,67
-2,86
4,579
o,129
2,5n 3,899 8,n4
5,106 4,498 4,%2
20,801 14,394
3,323 -9,89
-5,U1 -2,9O
3,435 5,437
-t2,ot2 -2,761
2,95 7,V23
4,471 -2,181
1,073 2,26
4,621 4,22t
-0.544 0,752
-2,9% -6,930
-1,994 -2,549
l3e+ \9n
-0,m6 -0,432
-3,940 -7,241 4,565 7,575 3,931 6,79t -4341 t,3y3
Sourcc: CSO (1989): "United Kingdom Balance of Payments", l9E9 Edition,
and CSO (lD0): "Unitcd Kingdom Balance of Prymentr:Preliminary Figures for 1990 Q3", December 12. 1990;
a negetive (poritive) rign indicatec a capital outflow (inflow) and represents an increase (decrease) in net intemational sssets;
the data are not rearoally adjusted.
lio transactions by both UK residents in foreign se-
curities, and by foreign investors purchasing UK se-
curities, have increased in magnitude after the removal
ofexchange controls. The balance on these 6ans4s[ie1s,
however, has not displayed any specific trends.
Long-term capital inflows and the current account bal-
ance provide an indication of the sustainability of trends
in a country's external accounts. The main reason is that,
unlike short-term capital movements which are volatile
and reversible, long-term capital movements are less
volatile and more permanent in character. The sum of the
balance on long-term capital and on the current account
is the basic balance. In the case of the IJK the basic
balance is shown in Table 2.7. It is clear that there has
been a sharp deterioration in the basic balance over much
of the 1980s, particularly over more recent years. In
1989, the net outflow on portfolio capiral, combined
with the current account and direct investment debits,
gave rise ro a basic balance deficit of UKL 46,1 billion.
The deterioration of the basic balance position in recent
years means that the financing of the current account
deficit has been effected through short-term capital in-
flows. This could suggest that the UK has become more
vulnerable to volatile expectations, and that the need to
maintain high interest rates to offset the associated risk
premia increased over the current cycle. In addition,
such weakness in the long-term capital balance could
have affected adversely the exchange rate. It is possible
that the recorded basic balance in fact underestimates the
external weakness involved. The distinction between
short- and long-term capital is an accounting rather than
an economic one; while, for example, the distinction is
made on the basis of the initial maturity of the security
in question, it is possible that, as the term to maturity
draws closer, the security becomes a short-term claim.
In addition, speculative transactions in stocks and equity
do not resemble the stable long-term capital flows the
basic balance purports to depict.
The rise in net inflows through the banking system mir-
rors the deterioration in the current account and the basic
balance. While banks probably aim at achieving a flat
net foreign asset position, or they unwind rapidly depar-
Teble 2.7: UK Internatlonal Thnsectlons:
The Brslc Belrnce
(UKL bllllon)
1980 1985 1987 l9EE 1989
CrrrcltlAccotnt 2,85 2,74 -431 -15,36 -19,52
Directlnredmat 
-0,51 -4,@ -10,52 -ll,O -0,98
Prtfoilolnvestmt 
-1,88 -10,51 24,12 4Ag -U,n
BrdcBducc 0A6 -12.37 9,29 -X1,34 -45,57
Sotrce : Calculated from rhe date in Tables 2.1 an,d2.6
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tures from this, large net crpital inflows have been re-
corded after 1987, both in sterling and in other foreign
currencies. These are more volatile than portfolio and
direct investment capital. Net inllows on this balance
peaked at UKL 15,9 billion in 1989. In the first half of
1990 net inflows have persisted, albeit at some lower
rate.
Increased borrowing by the UK's non-bank public from
banks abroad, as well as deposits with international
banks abroad, has taken place in recent quarters. The
outflow on deposits with banks abroad rose sharply in
1989 at UKL 9,4 billion; in the first half of this year,
however, the bulk of these transactions has been un-
wound. High interest rates in the UK, and the close
integration of the UK with world financial markets,
underlie the increased capital inJlows through non-bank
borrowing from banks abroad. This doubled between
1988 and 1989 to UKL 6,4 billion. In the first half of
1990 borrowing has continued even though there are
signs that it is easing.
Changes in international reseryes are related Io interven-
tion activities in foreign exchange markets. While at
times these changes have been sizeable, they are related
to operations in the foreign exchange market.
Net capital flows are the counterpart of current account
transactions they finance. The recent deficits have led to
an increased surplus in the capital account, which peaked
at UKL 7 billion in 1988. The largest comPonent of this
inflow in recent years has been of short-term character;
these inflows reflect surpluses on activites of the bank-
ing sector. This is also correlated with sterling-financing
of direct investment and portfolio activities of foreigners
in the UK. To the extent that these inflows are of volatile
and reversible character sterling's entry into the ERM
may impart greater stability. The high interest rates and
sterling volatility of the previous three years may be
indications that, indeed, short-term capital inflows were
sustained by a positive premium. At the same time,
despite the potential risks involved, there have been no
circumstances in which the supply of international capi-
tal to the UK appeared to have diminished.
The large flows on direct investment by UK residents
abroad would appear to suggest that the UK has become
a less attractive place to invest for UK residents com-
pared to the rest of the world. This could, perhaps, be the
case. Direct investment flows are motivated by longer-
term expectations about profitability, and it is possible
that UK investors perceive investment in the UK as less
profitable compared to investment abroad. An additional
factor is that direct investment is a portfolio decision,
representing a component of investors' portfolio and
determined according to expected return and risk. It is
very likely that these outflows rePresent portfolio diver-
sification activities, motivated by changing exPectations
of risk and profitability. The emergence of a positive
balance on direct investment in the first half of 1990 may
be an indication that international and domestic inves-
tors expect that investment in the UK will outperform
investment abroad; this is possibly related to oPPor-
runities brought forward by the completion of the inter-
nal market in 1992.
4. The international investment position of
the UK
The IIK has accumulated an impressive international
investrnent position over the past decade which, despite
the recent current account deficits, continues to rank
high in international comparisons. lnternational assets
constitute the principal source of eamings on invisibles,
and international liabilities give rise to invisibles pay-
ments. The worsening of net assets related to bank lead-
ing and borrowing internationally in the late 1980s is
highly correlated with the decline in the surplus on
invisibles.
Data on the UK's international assets and liabilities are
shown in Table 2.8. Total intemational assets have risen
from UKL 231 billion in 1980 to UKL 779,5 billion in
1989. The pricipal comPonent of international assets is
the stock of bank lending abroad, representing almost
54{lo of the total in 1989. Second in magnitute is the stock
of portfolio investment held by UK residents, followed
by equity in direct investment abroad. The rest of the
asset items are of lesser importance.
The stock of international liabilities has also risen during
this decade. At the end of 1989 total international lia-
bilities stood at UKL 867 billion, up substantially from
VKL 212,9 billion in the beginning of the decade. The
largest component of liabilities is the stock of interna-
tional borrowing by IIK banks. In terms of the banks'net
assets it has been a debit item in the accounts. The stock
of liabilities in the direct and portfolio investment ac-
counts are substantially less than the corresponding as-
sets. There has also been some notable increase in
non-bank borrowing from banks abroad, but this has also
been outpaced by dePosits.
The residual item in the balance of payments has been
the equivalent of a capital inllow in the 1980s and, as
such, represents a cumulative increase in the country's
international liabilities over this period. While not en-
tirely appropriate to treat the balancing item as a capital
account item, it nevertheless suggests that the official
estimates of the UK's international liabilities underesti-
mate the "true" indebtedness when unadjusted for the
cumulative net errors and omissions.
The country's net international investment position rose
sharply over the decade, from UKL 18,1 billion in 1980
to UKL 1i2,5 billion in 1989. This increase has been the
result of a stock adjustment Process in domestic and
international investors' Portfolios in response to the
rcmoval of exchange controls in 1979, and to financial
and regulatory innovations of the subsequent years'
While there has been some weakening in the stock of net
international assets in the late 1980s, large andpersistent
deficits would be required to reduce the country's accu-
mulated net international investment to any serious ex-
tent. In fact, the projected weaker economic activity next
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next year, and the reduction in the current account
deficit, will likely bring this developments ro a halr. Ir
may be argued that, after ten years offinancial deregula-
tion and reform, the current state of portfolios of UK and
international investors is in equilibrium. In this state, the
UK has emerged as a large international creditor.
The official statistics probably underestimate the extent
of the UK's net international investment, since equity
investment by UK residents abroad is recorded at book
rather than at market value. A market valuation of direct
investment, according to Pratten 2t would have these
estimates doubled. The principal source of the increase
is unrecorded capital gains. Given the country's overseas
equity investments, potential capital gains, of the order
of UKL 12 billion per annum, could be expected to more
than offset current account deficits at the rate recorded
in the late 1980s. The prospective srream of capital gains
should, of course, be evaluated at the probability that
capital losses could also emerge. In addition, they are
uncertain and erratic, and are principally related to world
inflation and to a genuine increase in the value of real
assets. In an environment of disinflation, inflation as a
source of capital gains will likely become of lesser im-
portance in coming years. However, further gains in the
values of real assets may be foreseable in coming years.
5. Concluding comments
The review of the evolution of the international transac-
tions of the IJK over the 1980s reveals the important
changes which have taken place as a result offinancial
and regulatory innovations. A consequence of these
changes has been that UK's financial markets have be-
come more closely integrated into world financial ac-
tivity, paralleling the integration of goods and services
markets which has taken place in the context of world
trade, and more specifically, EC trends. These develop-
ments have undoubtedly expanded the portfolio and
wealth opportunities of UK and international residents,
and have given rise to substantial gains from trade. In
addition, the increased responsiveness of UK,s import
demand in the 1980s, compared toprevious decades, also
suggests that substantial integration of the UK with thc
international economy has taken place. Greater integra-
tion in commodity markets requires financial markets of
greater breadth and depth to finance potential disequi-
libria without undue changes in exchange rates and
without disruptive volatility in financial markets. The
removal of exchange controls and the subsequent
reforms have, it can be argued, provided the required
background for greater stability in the country,s intema-
tional trade and payments.
The high elasticity of imports with respect ro domesric
spending suggests that, other things constant, an im-
provement in the current account deficit must be essen-
tially effected through expenditure adjustments. price
Tlble 2.t: The Internetlonel Investment Posltlon ol the uX(UKL bllllon, end of perlod)
1985 t987 1989
Ass€ts
Dlrec{ Investraent
Portfollo Investment
Bank Lendlng Abroad
Non-BankDepclts
Offlclal Rescrves
Other(r1
Total InternatloDal Assets
Llabllltles
Dlrec'S lnvestment
Portfollolnvcstmt
Bank Borrowlng from Abroad
Non-Bank Borrowlng from abroad
Other(r;
Total
Internationat Liabllltles
Net Interaatlooal
Investrrent Posltloo
33,2
l9,l
1473
7,6
13,3
10,5
231,O
26,4
I1,8
r569
9,3
8,5
2t2g
l8,l
73,9
lo2,l
369,7
22,6
13,2
18,0
seg$
43,3
?2,2
416,0
l9g
7,8
stg2
80,5
89,5
t20,4
425,4
n,8
n,o
t5,0
705,1
58J
62,1
474,2
23,6
to,7
629,1
76,0
1063
149,1
u8,r
tl,7
28,7
15,0
7789
6,9
76,8
5llJ
n,3
13,8
697,0
81,8
139,6
2213
sztg
6.5
26,3
23,9
9795
86,5
lm3
60so
39,0
36,2
867,0
tt25
(r) rcsidual. which includer ccntnl government and overseas authoritiec' holdingr of exchange r3scrves
21) SeeC.Pratten: op. cil
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elasticities appear to be small, and it would require large
exchange rate changes to Promote adjustment. The need
for expenditure adjustments to corrcct external disequili-
bria will be more pronounced in the coming years within
the ERM, because the exchange rate will play a lesser
role; expenditure-reducing or expenditure-expanding,
rather than expendinrre-switching, policies will be the
principal mechanisms of adjustment.
The main determinant of pronounced balance of pay-
ments movements is policy shocks; an expansionary
shock will be accompanied by a widening external
deficit. It is possible that the ERM constraints will limit
the frequency of policy-induced balance of payment
deficits. However, should they emerge, it will likely be
possible to finance them 8t foreseable interest differen-
tials without placing undue pressures on the exchange
rate system. To start with, the recent experience provides
no evidence that the financing of current account deficits
has occured under conditions of strain. Growing world
wealth has made financing of current account deficits
possible, albeit at some risk premium. These high real
interest differentials between the UK and other countries
constitute, in fact, the relative price necessary for inter-
national portfolios to adjust.
The decline in the trading advantage of the UK in ca-
tegories of goods which offer the greatest promise to
sustain employment and raise the standards of living in
the future may be an area of concern. A nation's com-
parative advantage is determined, to a large extent, by
the productivity associated with investment in technol-
ogy and education. The LIK aPPears to be experiencing
a secular decline in technology- and human-capital in-
tensive goods. While there are no balance-of-payments
reasons to intervene in international trade, there hay be
reasons for improving the country's longer-term produc-
tive potential that a reversal of the emerging Pattern of
specialization is warranted. The strengthening of UK's
comparative advantage in financial services is one
example of a successful adjustment to a widening Euro-
pean and, indeed, international financial environment.
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Chapter 3
The Efficiency of and Constraints on UK
Monetary Policy in the Late 1980s
1. Financial deregulation and more powerful
UK monetary policy
The Bank of England's macroeconomic model of the UK
economy provides econometric evidence that short-term
real interest rates have become more powerful in ex-
plaining the behaviour of the various components of
aSgregate demand -notably residential investment and
durable consumption- while long-term interest rates
have a strong impact on non-residential investment and,
especially, on investment in manufacturing, distribution
and services.
1.1 Efflclency of monetary tlghtenlng on the
personal sector
Financial innovation and liberalisation of the UK finan-
cial system during the eighties resulted in an increase in
competition. This both led to a reduction in costs and
margins of intermediation in the banking system and
enhanced the availability of credit. At the same time,
sustained growth in real incomes took place while con-
sumer confidence increased as inflation was slowing
down. As a result, both the financial assets and liabilities
of the personal sector experienced a sharp increase from
l98l onwards.
Monetary tightening -via higher base rates and, thus,
mortgage rates- has become more powerful than in the
past since a higher proportion ofhouseholders are now
affected by changes in mortgage rates and a higher per-
centage of the their incomes are devoted to mortgage
debt servicing. More stringent monetary conditions have
affected aggregate demand and inflation through two
traditional mechanisms:
. increasing the cost of borrowing, thus, making saving
more attractive; and
. by affecting real disposable income,
The factors which have increased the efficiency of inter-
est rate increases, from the mid-eighties onwards, are as
follows:
. the personal sector has moved from being a net credi-
tor to a net debtor, when only floating_rates assets and
liabilities are considered. This was mainly the result
of the financing of housing purchases. A rise of both
intervention and the deposits rates will have a negative
impact on the net balance of interest-bearing assets
and liabilities of the personal sector, since payments
will be higher than receipts;
. the stock ofpersonal sector net floating-rate assets as
a percentage of disposable income has decreased sub-
stantially since 1981;
. younger households have substantial net debt, face
higher debt-service ratios and have a greater marginal
propensity to consume than the older households
which, as a group, hold net assets;
. the amount of debt-service as a proportion of annual
disposable income shows, parricularly from 1988, a
marked increase when compared with the previous ten
years. This rise in the income gearing reflects both the
increase in the interest rates and the change in the
mortgage market following the break-up of the build-
ing society cartel and the entry of the banks when
financial liberalization took place in the early 1980,s.
1.2 Efflclency of monetary tlghtenlng ln the
corporate sector
Financial deregulation and increased competition in the
1980s led to an increase in both the assets and liabilities
side of the corporate sector financial balance sheet. The
factors which have increased the efficiency of a mon-
etary tightening in the corporate sector are related to the
substantial rise of companies'exposure to changes in
short-term interest rates:
. net interest-bearing liabilities have increased substan-
tially. Since 1987, the ner financial liabilities and the
negative ner "floating-rate" position of ICC's have
grown fast. This increase in borrowing partly reflects
the rapid growth in investment and dividend paSrments
during 1987-88 and higher levels ofmerger and take-
over activity.
. the corporate sector financial position has deteriorated
substantially. As aggregate debt indicators suggest, the
capital and income gearing ratios have increased
steadily since the middle of 1988 and ICCs moved into
a financial deficit towards the end of 1982.
2. Constraints on the efficiency of
monetary policy
2.1 Arlslng from the personal sector
A number of offsetting factors might have softened the
impact that interest rate increases could have had on
personal sector spending behaviour.
. annual adjustment schemes for mortgages might have
delayed the impact of higher mortgage interest rates;
. supply-side innovation by lenders may have attenu-
ated the effects of higher base rates;
. lenders had a greater incenl.ive to avoid increases in
the portgage interest rate in order to maintain turnover
because higher competition compressed lenders' profi t
margins in the mortgage market and, thus, increased
the share of items more directly related to the level of
turnover. As a result, the transmission of a tightening
in policy from base rates to mortgage rates has been
postponed although not reduced;
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Trble 3.1: Intercst R.tca
(qurrlerly rverrgcs)
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For the latest months thc Commission's forecasr have been
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. the reaction of wage bargaining, either to cuts in real
disposable income or to higher RPI - through higher
mortgage rates- in a context of labour market tight-
ness, might also have had a limiting impact on
monetary policy efficiency.
2.2 Arlsing from the corporate sector
Also in the corporate sector we can find a number of
factors suggesting a lower impactof monetary tightening
in the activity level:
. increased of profitability of the corporate sector, (the
real rate of return in capital was 9.5% in 1988-89
against 2.5% in l98l).
. improved financial position of companies, as a result
of the decrease in the inflation rate, when compared
with previous periods;
. the increase in nominal long-term rates has been
smaller than that in short-term rates, although some
catching-up took place recently. This might be
relevant for the efficiency of transmission mechanisms
to the extent that, except for housebuilding,
companies' investment was primarily influenced by
real long-term interest rates. But adjusted-inflation
long-term interest rates may also have increased since
early 1987 (Table 3.1).
3. TYhy has monetary policy not yet coped
with the inflation problem?
From 1985 to 1989, the UK economy experienced a
strong consumptionJed growth performance. Internal
demand outpaced domestic output growth, leaking into
price and current account deficit increases (Table 3.2).
Teble 3.2: Demend .nd output
(chenge per ennum)
Privare Toal Donrestic GDP
Consunrption Dermnd
rgts 3,73 2,94 3,68
1986 5,58 422 3,47
t9t7 5,38 5,09 4,73
l9tt 6,87 6,6E 4,13
19t9 3,87 3,49 2,18
1990 2,45 1,78 1,52
t99l I,l4 0,78 0,68
t992 1,88 1,95 2,37
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During the years 1982-87, UK inJlation appeared to be
under reasonable control. From 1988 onwards, however,
strains in the economy began to show up in inflation,
which accelerated from 4% dnritg most of 1987 to 69o
by April 1989 and to 10.6% in August 1990 on an RPI
basis. This increase was more muted when excluding
housing payments from the RPI (Greph 3.1), although
the upwards trend remained clear.
The main elements explaining the acceleration of infla-
tion can be summarized as follows:
Sources of poor lnflatlonary performance are home
grown....
The rise in wage costs failed to decelerate in response to
an improved price record in the mid- 1980s. Initially, this
reflected strong productivity gains, at least in manufac-
turing. But, subsequently, as productivity growth slowed
down, unit labour costs accelerated for the whole econ-
omy, from about 3.6% in 1987 to over 6.37o in 1988 and
9.47o in 1989 (Graph 3.2). In addition, profit margins
expanded substantially during the boom. The strengthof
domestic demand and the high level of capaciry utilisa-
tion enabled producers to increase profits and made them
more ready to accept wage claims, especially with a
weak pound -during much of 1989 and early 1990- which
protected the profitability of manufacruring industry
from international competition.
Moreover, houses were used as collateral for higher
spending on durable goods with unfavourable repercus-
sions on prices and the external deficit. This was
possible because house prices experienced a sharp re-
covery in 1982-88, with a particularly strong rise in
1988.
...and demand strength was underestlmated.
Over the past four years official statistics have been
showing significant discrepancies and have been sub-
mitted to major revisions which made their assessment
much less clearcut. The statistics on output and internal
demand for 1987-88, in particular, have been consistent-
ly revised upwards. There was also an important problem
of policy management: that of assessing and reacting to
the strength of private sector demand response to im-
proved medium-term business expcctations, sonsumer
conJidence rebuilt from the l98l-82 recession and in-
creased availability of borrowing opportunities against
optimistic perceptions of future earnings.
The strength of the demand response was initially under-
estimated by all forecasters, and the acceleration in in-
flation damaged the credibility of the Medium Term
Financial Strategy (MTFS) in maintaining downward
pressure on inflation expectations.
Monetary pollcy dld not react fully...
The unsustainable growth rate of domestic demand had
an inflationary potential which emerged only with some
delay. Interest rates were actually reduced in October
1987 (inresponse to the crash) and again, with much less
ex ante justification, in the spring of 1988, ro restrain a
rise in sterling. [t is rather clear that the monetary policy
mistakes of 1987 and early 1988 were technical, not
p oli tically-inspired.
Determined monetary policy measures to counter the
overheating were not taken until November 1988, mak-
ing the subsequent tightening of policy -illustrated both
by the upward shift in the yield curve and by its inversion
in 1989 and 1990 (Graph 3.3)- more severe because of
its tardiness.
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Teble 33: Monetery Aggregrtes
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...and the fall ln Sterllng loosened domestlc
monetary condltlons.
From early 1989 until May 1990, sterling was falling
under the impact of political worries and theirperceived
effect on the disinflationary commitment of the
authorities, despite a further rise in interest rates in
November 1989.
The political unpopularity of interest rate increases (be-
cause of their impact on mortgage holders) made it
imposible to react more vigorously to this slide in view
of the rather late position in the electoral cycle. How-
ever, there are also grounds for thinking that the pound
was lower than justified by "fundamentals" (i.e., the
changing balance of supply and demand in the
economy), and that a further increase in interest rates
would have been economically unjustifiable.
This change in market perceptions of the UK economy
contributed to loosening monetary conditions and made
it more difficult for monetary policy to affect wages and
profit margins since a declining pound enlarged the room
for manoeuvre of British export companies during 1989,
as well as contributing directly to inllation through
higher import prices.
4. Conclusions
Concerns have been expressed that deregulation and
supply-side innovation in financial markets during
during the 1980's may have weakened the impact of
monetary tightening on aggregate demand and inflation
and blurred the transmission mechanisms of monetary
impulses to the real sector.
However, recent econometric evidence makes it clear
that the impact of a hike in UK interest rates on expen-
diture has become more powerful in recent years. Both
the personal and the corPorate sectors are now more
interest rate sensitive.
Graph 3.4
...slnce monetary lndlcators were mlsread...
Monetary aggregates were less reliable as leading in-
dicators of nominal expenditure since they were affected
by structural shifts related to supply-side innovations
and credit deregulation throughout the 1980s.
It was more difficult to assess the overshooting of broad
money aggregates (sterling-M3 and M4) which were
growing at above lSVo a year from 1986 onwards (cf.
Table 3.3). This could represent an undesired evolution
of nominal expenditure -that should, therefore, be cor-
rected- or, in contrasl, could indicate changes in the
relative yields of financial assets included in the defini-
tion of broad money and those excluded, which should
be accommodated.
The question of whether or not fast growth of broad
money in 1986-87 and the acceleration of MO in 1988
was an independent source of inflation in 1989-90 can-
not, even now, be answered with any great confidence.
But it is clear that doubts about the indicator function of
the aggregates led, during 1987 and early 1988, to exces-
sive reliance on an indicator that was even more mislead-
ing, the exchange rate. At times, the authorities appeared
to take the view that the fast growth of the monetary
aggregates did not matter as long as the exchange rate
was firm against a stable anchor, the DM.
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The enlarged borrowing capacity arising from the finan-
cial innovation process has been compensated by the
shift in the personal sector from being a net creditor to
a net debtor. This reduced the ability of households to
maintain expenditure when debt service costs were in-
creasing.
An increase in borrowing took place in the corporate
sector, and during the past 18 months its financial posi-
tion has deteriorated substantially. As a result, com-
panies'erposure to interest rate changes has increased
significantly.
UK monetary policy has become apparently less effec-
tive in reducing headline inflation parrly because of the
mechanical effect ofhigherbaserates -and, [hus, higher
mortgage rates- on the RPI and the consequent heighte-
ning of wage pressures. If less distorted measures ar€
used, the acceleration in inflation has been much less.
Nonetheless, underlying inflation has increased very sig-
nificantly as the authorities underestimated demand
strength and were slow to tighten monetary policy in
order to face in time the inflationary potential of an
overheating economic situation. In fact, the required
degree of monetary tightness has needed to be consider-
able, given the strength of demand pressures (i.e., there
has been large outward shift in IS curve, so a big move
in the LM curye, involving politically-unpopular high
interest rates, has been necessary to counter overheat-
ing).
Moreover, the difficulty in assessing the stance of mon-
etary policy has increased during the 1980s. Structural
shifts related to financial market change and, in particu-
lar, to the deregulation of credit have affected the indi-
cator role of the monetary aggregates. The authorities
have had increasing recourse to flexibilitn discretion-
ality and judgement in implementing monetary policy,
and focused in a range of indicators, including the ex-
change rate, asset prices, the yield curve and coincident
indicators of activity as well as monetary aggregates.
None of these, singly or in combination, has yet provided
an accurate guide to:
. the degree of monetary tightness required; and
. the degree of monetary tightness prevailing.
In spite of the constraints imposed by the above-men-
tioned stnrctural factors, which could delay the contrac-
tionary impact of a hike in interest rates, a tightening of
UK monetary policy should have, all in all, a greater
impact in both reducing expenditure and fighting against
inflation than was the case in the past and should have
such an impact with fewer distortionary side-effects. The
tightening of monetary policy, however, will eventually
bring down the underlying rate of inflarion only through
a period of higher unemployment, as in other countries.
The recent entry of sterling into the ERM with wide
bands preserves some margin of manoeuvre for mon-
etary policy. Whetherpolicy will aquire more credibility,
resulting in a more direct, expectational influence on
wages and prices (i.e., a reduction in the output cost of
disinflation), induced by ERM entry is an open question,
with the econometric evidence relating to existing ERM
members still mixed.
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Housing
1. Introduction
The economic impact of the housing market in the UK
has attracted considerable attention. One main reason is
that, in any analysis of the 1986-88 overheating, it is
clear that housing played a considerable destabilising
role. Secondly, there are considerable fears that this
potential for destabilisation is still potent and could be
extremely damaging to future economic performance
within the ERM. Thirdly, there are grounds for believing
that the housing market is a serious impediment to the
efficient functioning of the labour market. Finally, be-
cause of housing's central social role, it has become
subject to considerable influence from targeted interven-
tion through the taxation and public expenditure regimes
and through environmental planning controls; it is thus
natural to wish to examine the scope for revising such
policies to produce a more economically desirable out-
come.
2. Main features of the UK housing market
ln general terms, the UK has shared to a larger degree
than the continental European economies (but in com-
mon with other English-speaking countries and with
Japan) the desire to promote home ownership as against
other forms of tenure. This desire has been particularly
shared by the present government. In 1987 637o of
households in Great Britain were owner-occupiers, up
from549o in l98l and497o in l97l; in the 30-59 age
group (by head of household), the 1987 proportion ap-
p.o"in"a three-quartert 22. withit the overall category
of owner-occupation, about three-fifths are owned with
a mortgage, overwhelmingly from a bank or building
society.
Of the 37Vo of households renting in 1987, over two-
thirds were renting from local authorities while under a
third - about a tenth of all households - were renting
privately, mostly unfurnished ProPerty. Particularly
striking over the Past twenty years have been the rough
halving in privately rented accommodation and the
decline in the local authority housing stock' The latter
followed subsidised sales to tenants in consequence of
the central government's "right to buy" legislation of
1980 and 1988 and reduced public expenditure for the
construction and renovation of housing. The lack of an
accessible rental market of adequate size and quality
encourages owner occupation at a relatively early age:
on average, well under thirty for first-time buyers.
Housing overall in the UK aPPearB to be in excess suPp-
ly: by 1987 the housing stock numbered 22,8 million
dwellings, compared with 2l,5million households the
previous year. Residential investment as a ProPortion of
GDP declined slightly during the 1980s, to about 3 tlz%o,
significantly lower than in the major industrialised
countries as a whole (about 57o). Over half the housing
stock was constructed Post-war.
Home ownership is by far the largest single item in
personal sector net wealth - 52% fot the gross value of
housing in 1988 (40% for housing equity) - just as
mortgages are by far the largest component of financial
liabilities - 65% in 1988. A tendency to regard housing
wealth in financial asset terns encourages high turnover
in the housing market, with morgages redeemed, on
average, after about six to seven years, resulting from
"trading up" to more exPensive properties with higher
gearing of mortgage debt to income.
22) Social trends, 1990 edition. By region the proportions for all households are fairly homogeneous with the suiking exception
of Scotland, where home ownership is proportionately lower than tenure of public housing (43% amparedwith 487o in
1987): Regional Trends, 1989. Among the richer countries of the Community, the UK has the higlrcst &gree of home
ownership with the excepion of Italy. There is a weak inverse relationship benveen national income levels and home
ownership - see Graph 4.1. The UK owner-occupation proportion is strikingly higher than in Germany (rea excluding new
Lender), which in 1987 was 38%; subsidised tenancies in Germany in the same yea accormted fot?,O%o of.the total occupied
stock, a ttrird of the rental market.
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3. Public interyention in the housing market
Public intervention in the housing market has been ex-
tensive and of long-standing. The main forms include
direct provision ofhousing, through local authorities and
housing corporations, rent and security of tenure control,
in both the public and private rented sectors, tax reliefs
on owner occupation, mortgage financing, and provision
for rental, the "right to buy legislation" just noted, and
environmental planning controls affecting the potential
for new building.
Controls of long-standing over the private rental market
have resulted in the major reduction in tenure referred to
above through a shrinkage of effective supply. Excess
demand is shown by free market rents being substan-
tially above controlledrents (in 1979 rhis gap was esti-
mated at about 75% ". The shrinkage of the sector
resulted in controls being eased from 1988, particularly
by new tenancies being linked to market rents and for
more shorthold tenancies. Local authorities were em-
powered in the same year to subsidise private sector
rental provision, while the Business Expansion Scheme
(BES) introduced in 19E3, giving tax relief on invest-
ment, was extended to companies letting accommoda-
tion. Other rccent govenrment initiatives yet to mske
significant headway include the encouragement of
"housing action trusts" (HAIs) and the "rent inlo mort-
gage" option for encouraging more local authority ten-
ants to trander progressively into private ownership
status. A consistent theme of central govemment action
has been to reduce local authority tenure.
It seems unlikely that these initiatives will have a major
impact on widening the private rental market when set
against the fiscal incentives to mortgage-financed home
ownership. These are both ofa current and capital nature.
On the current side, given the general approximation of
the UK's pglsonal taxation system to a comprehensive
income tax n, the main incentive is the absence of any
tax on imputed income. This contrasts with the BES
forrental provision. The replacement of domestic rates
by the community charge in Great Britain, completed in
1990, removed the one outstanding tax related to domes-
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P. Minfor4 P. Ashtotl md M. Poe[ 'The effecs of housing distortions on rmemployment", Oxford Economic Papers, 1988.
i.e. where income from wealth is taxed at tlre same rate as eamed income md asses are ac<armulated ftrom post-tax income.
The thoretical alternative is an expendinne tax systeor where the reurms from assets are exempt but dissaving is taxed. The
UK systern is actually mixe4 srd some importantrec€Nrt reforms have been of an expendiune tax nantre, e.g. pEps and
TEssAs dlowing tar-free reurns ftom equities md deposits urder certain conditions.
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tic property income. The second current incentive is the
income tax relief on mortgage interest Payments related
to a main residence up to a mortgage ceiling of IIKL
30,000 (a ceiling which has remained unchanged in
nominal terms since 1983). On the capital side, capital
gains on a main residence owned for at least one year are
exempt from capital gains taxation. The official esti-
mated cost of mortgage interest relief in 1989-90 is UKL
7 billion, the largest single relief after account is taken
of the main initial allowances. The estimated cost of
capital eains relief is also estimated at UKL 7 billion,
uui mor-" tentatively fi. Th"r" surui compare with total
revenue raised from income tax in 1989-90 of UKL 48'8
billion and from capital gains tax of IIKL 1,9 billion; in
1990-91 one per cent off the standard rate of income tax
would have cost about IJKL I trz billion in revenue.
The IIK is not, of course, the only country to give
favourable tax treatment to mortgage-financed owner
occupation. Among industrialised countries surveyed by
the OECD on the basis of their 1987 tax rules, the US,
France, Japan, Austria, Ireland and Australia allowed
mortgage interest deductibility and left imputed income
untaxed, although in France the tax credit rather than
allowance syst; [mited the gain (Table 4.1) 25. In
practice, the actual operation of the tax systems under
various inllation and real interest rate and financing
assumptions result in computed "tax wedges" for hous-
ing investment where the tIK (only matched by Sweden)
is outstandinglygenerous for typical mortgage financing
- see Table 4.22' . Of ptrticular note from the table is not
only the largc but extremely inllation-progressive tax
advantage in the (JK, as higher nominal interest rates (in
reality mostly representing a form of premature capital
repayment) are also offset against tax uP to the mortgage
Teble tl.2: Trx wedges for houslng lnvestment
(Percentrge polnts, uslng 19t5 tlr perrmeters)
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Note: Thecalcularionstakeintoaccount:
a) the dcductibility of intc,rcst paynpns and eventusl limits'
b) the availaHlity of tax qodits and subcidized loans'
c) the taxation of impurcd incanr fronr o'ner-oocupicd housing.
Source : M. Fukao and M. Henazaki: "lntemarionelisarion of financid markets and the allocation of capiul". OECD Economic
Studies, Spring 1987.
zsl
26!,
Source: l$Opublic expendiure white paper, Cm 1021. The costof mortgage interestraterclief will fall as interestrates ue
reduced.
A. Dea11 M. Drnsr4 J. Fallon and P. Hoeller, Saving trends and behaviour in OECD countries, OECD \\Iorking Paper
No.6?, Junel989. Note thar Table A4.l excludes local property taxes (e.g. France has a system very close to the domestic
rates replaced in rhe UK). The table thus urderestimates the UK's fiscd generoeity owards housing.
Note, however, that the OECD calculations based on 1985 tax paranreters in Table A4.l assumed for the uK a tpical
property costing UKL 378ffi. Non-indexation of the UKL 30000 mqtgage ceiling. a relatively mrrh higlrr rise in the UK in
Louse prices (a UK average of UKL ?50ffi in 1989) amd areductio,n in UK income tax rates will have reduced the UK wedge.
27),
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ceiling. Moreover, of the countries just mentioned, the
US, Japan and Australia taxed capital gains on housing,
as did Austria if the property were disposed of within ten
years of acquisition 'o. Only Ireland had a similarly
liberal tax regime, and then not in the context of the
degree offinancial liberalisation undertaken by the LIK
during the 1980s. While interest deductibility (in real
terms, indexed for inflation) can be theoretically justi-
fied under a comprehensive income tax system as being
neutral in asset allocation effect, such a system would
also of necessity i-mply taxation of imputed income and
real capital gains 29-
Apart from stimulating demand for housing, the uend of
public intervention has also in recent years tended to
limit its supply. The restricrion of the private rented
sector, followed more recently by a measure of deregu-
lation, has been described above. The enforced sale of
publicly owned housing by giving renanrs the right to
buy (first in 1980, then with fewer restrictions in 1988)
is directly neutral in effect. Over time, however, it may
contribute to a growing mismatch between supply and
demand by restricting the supply of entry-level accom-
modation. More obviously, the large decline in net pub-
lic expenditure on housing represents only partially the
effect of such sales. Total general government expendi-
ture on housing, net ofreceipts from sales, declined from
UKL 6,1 billion in 1979-80 to UKL 2,9 billion in 1988-
89, a real decline of three-quarters. As a proportion of
general government expenditure, housing declined from
5,57oin 1979--80 to3,27o in 1988-89 (anestimated3,TTo
in 1989-90 30. A ma;or decline in puUtic housing com-
pletions during the 1980s has been the major factor
behind the decline in overall housebuilding since the
1970s: in 1989 only 17,7 thousand public dwellings were
completed against 88,5 thousand in 1979, although most
of the reduction was made up by higher private comple-
tions (Graph 4.2)3r.
Given the significant net surplus of housing compared
with households and the undoubted quality improvement
over recent decades, the decline in public and (in trend
terms) private housebuilding seems appropriate in terms
of overall resource allocation. Nevertheless, the boom in
house prices over the 1980s discussed below was region-
ally very differentiated. Above all, the extreme skewing
of house price inflation to London and the south-east
suggests supply factors as well as higher regional growth
of demand played a role, with relatively stronger plan-
ning controls on new development in the region.
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Price Waterhouse Intemational Tax Guide 1989, quoted in Greenwell Gilt Weekly, No. 229, 19.3.1990.
Alternatively, !o retain neutrality within an expenditure tar( system mortgage interest dedtctibility would be abolished but
imputed income and capital gains could rernain untaxed.
Armual Abcract" 1990; prblic expenditure white pryer, January 1990, (op cit).
Muellbauer and Murphy nevertheless consider that ttre decline in public completiom during the 1980s had a significmt effecr
in bidding up house Jnices, given real income growth. See J. Muellbauer, The Great BritistrHousing Disaster and Economic
Policy, lnstitute for Public Policy Researc]u Economic Study No.5, 1990.
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4. The role of housing in the 1986-88
overheating
House prices rising far in advance of general price infla-
tion or, more significantly, real income growth, were
both a primary symptom and cause of the overheatiug
during the last cycle. The average price ofnew dwellings
on which mortgages were aPProved rose by 177o p.a. in
1986 and 1987 and by 26% p.a. in 1988, taking the ratio
of house prices to eamings to an historically high level
(Graph 4.3). This gcnerated a substantial increase in
personal sector net wealth 32. Pti""t rose a further 1696
in 1989, from the end of which year prices have been
roughly static but with an apparently marked contraction
of tumover. These are national averages: the "boom and
bust" has been more pronounced in London and south-
east England, where there have been significant nominal
falls over the past year. The last comParable cycle in
house prices was associated with the 1973 boom, al-
though there was a minor cycle peaking with the econ-
omy in 1979.
The causes of the recent rise in house prices are not
typically fully explained by standard modelling tech-
niques. It is clear that the factors which usually lead to
higher house prices would have led to some significant
rise in any case: real income growth, rising employment,
increasing household formation for demographic and
social reasons, falling interest rates, increasingly tight
planning controls, declining construction and a shrink-
ing rental market were factors in this direction. Never-
theless, over and above these factors, it seems clear that
house prices responded to the financial liberalisation
undertaken in the 1980s and that this was a major factor
in both directly and indirectly (via 1q effects on demand
and income growth) raising prices ".
The first major additional factor affecting the housing
market was the entry of banks on a substantial scale into
the mortgage market following the removal of credit
controls in 1980, which themselves had become ineffec-
tive following the ending of exchange controls in 1979.
Competition from the banks prompted the building so-
cieties to drop their interest rate cartel and led to exten-
sive deregulation of the societies in 1986. The Building
Societies Act of that year liberalised both the asset and
liabilities sides of their operation, inter alia allowing
wholesale money market borrowing, the granting of sec-
ond mortgages and unsecured loans (though at least 907o
of lending had to consist of first mortgages on principal
residences).
Financial liberalisation replaced a system of extensive
societies-administered credit controls, characterised by
cartelized, below market rate mortgages with mortgage
queues offluctuating length. From 1986 onwards there
was a major increase in borrowing by the personal sector,
principally accounted for by loans booked for house
purchase (Graph 4.4). Total loans for house purchase
rose from UKL 19,0 billion in 1985 to UKL 40,8 billion
in 1988. This compares with a doubling of total personal
sector borrowing from 2l,2billion to UKL 54,8 billion
over the same period.
s2)
33)
The increase in the value of the housing stock accormted for just over half of the 487o nominal increase in gross personal
Eector wealth benpeen 1985 and 1988. The bulk of the remaining increase was due to the stock market boom.
Muellbauer, op. cil, reports that a conventional model of the ratio to income of the mortgage stock less equity witMrawal
"hugely rmderpredicts for 1981-88 with the pediction enor peakhg in 1987-88"; similarly for the ratio of mortgage advances
to house prices for first-time buyers.
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More significantly, the increase in the stock of mortgage
debt over the three years 1986 to 1988 of IIKL 94,5
billion compares with a cumulative flow of personal
sector investment in fixed assets of LJKL 38,2 billiou on
new dwellings and IIKL 15,5 billion on net purchases of
land and existing buildings -UKL 54,7 billion in total-
over the same period (Graph 4..5). A large part of the
difference represented substantial "equity with&awal ",
i.e. increased debt on the existing housing stock il.
Given the continuing increase in house prices, capital
gearing actually fell slightly: the mortgage stock of IJKL
127 billion in 1985 compared with LIKL 527 billion for
the value of personal sector housins QA%); by 1988
mortgage debt of VKL 222 billio-q compared with a
housing stock of 964 billion (23%)t5.Equity withdrawn
(replaced by borrowing on preferential mortgage terms)
added to but far outweighed the still substantial UKL 6
billion increase in non-mortgage borrowing between
1985 and 1988 to finance higher consumer spending.
Overheating thus became a cumulatively reinforcing
process, in which the supply of and proceeds from hous-
ing finance became a key factor. Equity withdrawn
stimulated consumer spending (with a high import con-
tent), real income and overall demand growth. This in
turn stimulated the rise in house prices, where part of the
rise seems to have been a speculative bubble
phenomenon, encouraging more eguity withdrawal,
aided and abetted by new and vigorous competition
between the banks and building societies to expand their
assets. House price inflation, skewed to London and the
south-east, added to general inllationary pressures by
inhibiting labour mobility and inciting wage claims
made more difficult to resist by the lack of skilled labour
36. High"t house prices, and thus mortgages, added
directly to the retail prices index (the main reference for
wage bargaining) because of the chain-weighting
process ofrevising the index basket. This effect, which
in 1990 was still affecting year-on-year comparisons of
the index, would thus have "exaggerated" the increase in
underlying inflation even without the mortgage rate in-
creases since 1988.
The expansion also had the sonventional effect of
stimulating a residential construction boom, although
this was not a primary source of the overheating of
demand (see again Graph 4.1). Residenrial investment
peaked in 1988 at a level about a fifth above that ofthree
34) The difference between 0te increase in ttrc mortgage sock md the flow of residential investment is only an upper limit
indication of the extent of equity with&awal. In practice, there re other reasonr for discrepancy zuch as new mutgages taken
out on @uested Property: see A.E. Holmans, Govemment Eoonomic Service Working Pryer No. y2,1956. A. Kalesky,
writing in the Financial Times on 29.6.90, ("Home tuths on housing market") quotes rurpublished Burk of England estimates
on equity wi0r&awal rising from UKL 1,3 billion in 1980 to UKL24,5 billion in 1988.
For 1989, it is estimated that gearing ronained aowrdZ3?o.
A particular factor betrind the rise in house prices in the UK generally, but especially in Lordon and the south-east, may have
been the expansion of ernployment in financial services. Here salaries are typicatly u a prenrium and fringe benefia ofen
include subsidised mortgages.
3s)
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Private investment in dwellings dropped about 6% in
1989 and perhaps dropped by somewhat more in 1990.
The sharply cyclical behaviour of private housebuilding
has nevertheless been destabilising, and the contraction
of the industry in 1990 was a forerunner of a wider
downturn.
5. The disincentive to labour mobility
Tne effects of the housing market in restricting labour
mobility have already been alluded to. There are three
principal problems: the lack of an adequately large and
flexible free rental market; the difficulty of gaining ac-
commodation in or, once in, transfer between, public
("council") housing; and regional house price differen-
ces, especially the lrrge premium in London and the
south-east which inhibits inward migration. All three
factors reflect the unintended side-effects of public pol-
icy intervention in the housing market.
Labour mobility within the UK has traditionally been
low, leaving significant dispersion in regional unem-
ployment rates and, to a lesser extent (because compen-
sated by public transfers), in real income levels. Why
this should be so probably partly reflects substantial
social immobility, given the strength of regional cultural
differences within the UK. Nevertheless, research shows
a substantial effect from housing tenure differences 37.
Subsidised public housing tenants are, unsurprisingly,
the most immobile and this seems to play a major role in
restricting mobility of manual workers.
The effects of low labour mobility are further explored
in Chapter 2.1 on wage determination. In the longer run
market mechanisms should offset the extreme imbalan-
ces of housing accommodation and price that have de-
veloped in the 1980s. Employers have incentives to
relocate in areas where accommodation is cheaper and
more plentiful and thus where staff are easier to attract
and retain, easing pressure on congested regions. Indeed
there is already some evidence for this in the course of
the current slowdown, with house priceshaving fallen
the most in nominal terms in London 'o. Given the
persistence of the problem in the UK it would, however,
be unwise to count on this trend being substantial.
Moves to increase labour mobility from the side of the
housing market need to focus on ensuring a better re-
gional balance of housing supply and demand and morc
flexible tenure arrangements. This probably implies as a
first priority a larger free rental sector and subsidised
provision targeted by household income rather than by
tenure. Changes in owner occupation could also be eased
by simplifying the conveyancing process (e.g. by regis-
tering all property) and thus cheapening transfer costs,
though these are already low in international compari-
son.
6. The housing market in the context of the
ERM
The deficiencics in the stnrcture of the UK housing
market identified above - particularly the fiscal distor-
tions and the constraints on labour mobility from an
insufficiently large pool of rented dwellings at market
prices - are such that it would have been wise to correct
them even if the UK had remained outside the exchange
rate mechanism. With membership now achieved, this
becomes more urgent, if a damaging repeat of housing's
destabilising contribution to the recent overheating is to
be avoided.
The personal sector in general has become used to re-
garding housing as the asset offering the most secure,
risk-free rewards. Particularly because of the fiscal in-
c€ntives of mofigage-financed owner occupation and the
large trend appreciation in house prices it has been ra-
tional to do so. Obtaining the largest available mortgage
and acquiring the most valuable dwelling (especially in
periods of high inflation), with frequent "trading up",
has thus been encouraged. The current depression in the
housing market has reversed some of the recent gains,
but it would be surprising if this potential pattem had
ended. The replacement of domestic rates - linked, if
indirectly, to imputed income on housing - by the com-
munity charge has added another incentive to invest in
housing 39.
Many observers have drawn attention to the potential
overhang for equity withdrawal which the housing stock
in a financially liberalised context represents *'. Of the
value of housing of around UKL I 120 billion at end-
1989, outstanding mortgages represented only IIKL 255
billion. Thus, if nominal sterling interest rates decline
significantly within the ERM (as the risk premium is
eroded, and inllation is brought under control), there is
a substantial risk of a sharp increase in personal sector
mortgage borrowing. Part of this would almost certainly
represent equity withdrawal (i.e. higher gearing on the
37)-
38)
3e)
40)
G. Hughes md B. McCormick, "Housing markets, unemployment and labour market flexibility in the UK", European
Economic Review Vol.31 No3, April 1987.
The contrrction of financial services employment in the City of London may also have played arole Cf. n.15.
According o estimales by P. Sperrcer and G. Hughes, the effect might be !o add l8-Mo to house price-income ratios. These
estimates may be at the top end of the range.
See, e.g., Muellbauer, op. cit., and articles and letters in the FinancialTimes through July 1990.
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housing stock) through higher first and subsequent mort-
8ages, and possibly unduly stimulate private consump-
tion directly. Even that part which was fully reflected in
an increased value ofhousing would be likely to generate
significant, again possibly destabilising, wealth effects
on private consumption.
Both longer term and more imrnediate solutions have
been offered. Financial liberalisation might be partially
reversed, 1'q1 slample, with more "prudent" limis en-
forcedon theextent to which housing couldprovide loan
collateral 41. Most of the other solutions concern refor-
ming the tax system. In the longer tenn a reinclusion of
property or land values in the tax base (local or central
government) seems to be called for. If this were accom-
panied by the phasing out of mortgage interest rate relief
(or its limiting to the frst few years, as in Germany) then
a substantial, demand-neutral reduction in tax rates
could be envisaged.
The more immediate need to control the flow of equity
withdrawal might also be approached through the tax
side. Spencer and Kalesky (elaborated by Muellbauer)
separately have argued for extending capital gains tax to
main residences. Under one version of this proposal, on
a combined sale and purchase transaction, tax would be
attracted on the excess of the realised sales value of a
house over the equity invested in a new dwelling, less an
exemption limit (e.g., UKL 5 (XX) p.a., indexed). The
limit would also apply to mortgage increases on existing
property above the exemption limit'".
7. Conclusions
The housing market is subject to significant distortions
arising from public intervention, principally tenure con-
trols and fiscal incentives to mortgage-financed owner
occupation. The private (or market-related) rental mar-
ket is too small to erurure sufficient labour mobility. Tax
reform in the direction of greater neutrality towards
housing should be pursued. In the shorter term there may
be a case on stabilisation grounds for extending capital
gains taxation to primary residences, and for controls on
the provision of credit secured against housing.
411 E.g. the suggestion by Shields that first mortgages should not exceAg2% of the prrchase price and that zub,sequent new
secrned loans would not be allowod to exceA70% of the value. See J. Shiel&, "Conrolling household credit", National
Instinrte Economic Rwiew, August 1988. Shields alternatively suggests a tax on credit
J. Muellbauer, leu€( to the Financial Times, I 1.7.1990.421
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Chapter 5
Fiscal Policy
1. The nominal framework: the medium-term
financial strategy
Budgetary policy continues to be made within the frame-
work of the Medium Term Financial Suategy (MTFS)
first adopted in the March 1980 Budget and revised
annually since. The approach has remained to provide "a
nominal framework within which the Government pur-
sues its objective of bringing down the rate of infla-
tion" 43. Essential attributes are the setting of
medium-term paths (typically, the current and three
prospective financial years) s for monetary aggregates,
money GDB the GDP deflator and the public finances,
ln the UK context, the main initial novelties of this
approach were a medium-term monetarist approach to
achieving disinflation by attempting to influence the
expectational environment and the bringing together of
revenue and expenditure planning, also over the me-
dium-term.
While the approach to moneta_ry policy in the MTFS has
undergone drastic revision a) the fiscal policy frame-
work has shown grelter apparent stability. Key aspects
are the publication in each MTFS a6 litself published as
part of the principal Budget document, the Financial
Statement and Budget Report (FSBR)) of medium-term
paths for minimally disaggregated general government
expenditure and receipts and public sector borrowing
(or, since 1987-88, debt repayment). Table 5.1 shows the
these aggregates from the March 1990 MTFS. Aggre-
gates are shown throughout in nominal, not deflated
ter*, 47. Public expenditure plans for the MTFS period
(less the outlying year) are published in detail at the turn
of the year preceding the MTFS. The main new informa-
tion contained in each MTFS as regards budgetary policy
is thus the prescribed stance for taxation and public
sector borrowing.
The indicated path for public sector borrowing is not
necessarily, however, the residual between general gov-
ernment expenditure and receipts and the allowance for
market and overseas borrowing by public corporations.
In practice an unidentified "wedge", the so-called "fiscal
adjustment", has always been included to boost the net
borrowing profile in financial years beyond that of the
new Budget year, allowing scope for futurc tax reduc-
tions, higher expenditure or higher debt repayment. By
convention the fiscal adjustment has been regarded as
indicating future tax reductions.
There is a second element implicit in the MTFS which
adds to uncertainty about future plans. This is the
"reserye" in the detailed public expenditure plans which
is an unallocated contribution to total future expendi-
ture, allowing for higher than budgeted inflation as well
as genuinely additional expenditure. In recent years the
reserve has been massive for outlying years of the public
expenditure plans: in March. 1990, for example, the
reserve for 1992-93 was budgeted at around I tn%o of
GDP for that year.
Fiscal plans for future years are thus subject to consid-
erable uncertainty, despit€ the apparent precision of the
MTFS numbers. In addition, as might be expected, the
published inflation profile has always been optimistic.
There is, consequently, some loss of credibility in the
exercise, the more so as successive annual revisions to
the MTFS projections in recent yeers have been large ar,t-d
have given the impression of being opportunistic '".
Moreover, in the UK the synthesis of revenue andexpen-
diture planning which is of the essence of the fiscal side
of the MTFS does not correspond to the annual cycle of
fiscal policy making. In practice, public expenditure
plans for the forthcoming financial year 8re settled in the
second half of the preceding calendar year, with indi-
cated plans for future years reopened for negotiation a
year afterwards. The "Budget" in March is oriented to
tax decisions for the year ahead in the light of the public
expenditure decisions already taken (and in March sub-
ject to usually only minor revision).
The economic significance of publication of the MTFS
fiscal aggregates for years beyond the one immediately
ahead is difficult to gauge. The original intention, to
show public sector borrowing was consistent with
planned monetary growth, lost some of its force with the
move away from the early emphasis on sterling M3
growth (to which the PSBR was directly related as an
€)
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Financial Statement and Budget Report (FSBR), March 1989.
The financial year nrns from April to March.
Notably, inczeased enrphasis on the exchange rate as an indicator ofmonetary conditions ard the shift from broad to narow
money as a targeted aggregate.
Published as part of the principal Budget document, the Financial Starement and Budget Report (FSBR).Text of Footnote
The 1980 and 1981 versions of the MTFS showed deflated aggregates.
As the OECD remarked in its most recent survey of the UK ecoromy, recent practice has been to project forwrd unchurged
in the forthcoming frnancial year the estimated nominal outnrm for public sectu &bt repayment in the furancial yer jrst
ending, despite tlrere being substantial changes for this aggregate in zuccessive MIFSs, i.e. the official PSDR fqecasts were
subject to large enors.
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Teble 5.lA: The Medlum-Term Flnenclel Str.tegy, Merch 1990: A. Generrl Government Expcndlture
(UKL blltlon)
198&19 r989-90 l99G9l t99t-92 tw2-93 1993-94
Pnbltc cxpcndltucphnning tot l
Locd euthorltles' sclf-Ilnrncod cxpcdtfurc
Cmtrd govcmnmet debt intcrcd
Accumting edjustmots
General goveimmnt crycmdihrrc u
h"lvetlsetlonprreedr
Generd govommt crycndere
excluding prlvetlsr0c prrcdg
t455
10,1
17,5
5,0
t7w
4
179
t3w
t7
3rn
t92
t4
t5w
3w 4w
20t
r5
l5
162
t4
215
15
l5
1782
7,r
198 213 225 238 EO
45555
1853 292 218 23O 243 255
I ) General govemmcnt cxpcnditure, privetisation proceeds end the public expenditure planning total rre rounded to the nearest
UKL I billiqr from 1989-90 orwardc; locel euthorities'self-finenced expenditure, debt interest and accounting edjustments
are rounded to thc ncrr€st UKL t2 billion. Gcncnl govemment cxpcnditure ercluding privetisation proceedr is arumed to
D E'JI'Hr'3i:3#"Xi:'rff-nH':H:r-301' debt interest paymenrs ro orher secrors as rollows (uKt bitlion):
1988-89 - 18,0: l9t9-90 - l8n: 1990-9t - thni t99t-92 - t&n;1992-93 - 16;, t993-94 - rirz
Sowcc : Financial Staternent and Budget Report (FSBR), March 1990
Table 5.lB: The Mcdlum.Term Flnrncl.l Strrtegn March 1990: B. Generel Government Recelpts
(UKL bllllon)
198&89 1989-90 l99G9l t99t-92 1992-93 1993-94
Trxee on lncoq cxpendltre rnd crpltrl 144,8
33,0
6,5
5,5
158
33
7
6
170
36
6
6
177
38
6
186
40
6
196
43
6
8
Nedmd lnnrrencc end otbcr cqrtrlbuflonr
Intercst end dlvldcn&
Olherrecelpts
Genenl governmnt rccelpt r)
of ntich Nrtb Sor rweoucr
189,8 203 219 229 240 2l3
3,2
tax
2) General govemment receifts, and its iompotenii. are rr5unded to the nerrest UKL I billion from l9E9-90 onwards.
Sourcc : Financial Statement and Budget Report (FSBR), March 1990
Tebte 5.1C: The Medlum-Term Flnrnclet Strrtegy, Merch 1990: C. Publlc Sector Debt Repryment r
(UKL bllllon)
198&89 1989-90 l99G9l t99t-92 t92-93 1993-94
Generd governrrnt rccctpts
Gencrd govemmnt cryendthue
Ftscd rdJustrrnt from prevbus yerrs
Annurt llscd rdjudmut 
'
GGDR,
Publlc corporetlonr' merlet rrd
overse$ dcbtrsprymt
PSDR
Murey GDPet mrrlet prlccs'
PSDR s % ofcDP
to lhe nearert
189,8 203 219 229 2N 253
1782 198 2t3 225 238 250
::::12
ll,5 6 6 3 0 0
14,5
478,1 519 548 585 622 657
_ _ _ _ _t5-r2- 
- 
_ _ _ _ _ !::91 _ _ _ _ _ _ JI?g) 
- - - - 
_ _ _!6_32 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ !S:l_
3 lrr 1u4 rn 0 0
onwards.
3,0
Means lower taxes or hicher exoenditure than essumed in lines I and 2.
Figures in brackets adjuir for rhi distortion arising from the replacement of domestic rates by the community charge.
nria : Financial Stateircnt and Budget Repon (FSBR), March 1990
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expansionary influence). A later use was to demonstrate
the trends of taxation and expenditure in relation to GDP
and thus in relation to the Sovernment's objectives of
reducing both these ratios 49. In current circumstances
assessing the impact of future tax policy is hazardous:
assumptions must bc made about future inflation, alloca-
tion of the expenditure reserve and the fiscal adjustment.
This difficulty concentrates attention, PerhaPs unduly,
on very recent trends in public finances and future
projections delivered by conventional forecasting tech-
niques.
2. Recent developments in public sector
borrowing and debt repayment
Recent developments in the public finances are shown
in Table 5.3. The most notsble feature is the emergence
of a huge negative PSBR, i.e. a positive PSDR (debt
repayment), in 1988-89 (3% of GDP) after a move to
modest debt repayment the previous year' its halving in
l9S9-90 and a further weakening in the current financial
year despite the March 1990 Budget forecast of main-
tenance of the 1989-90 level.
Graph 5.1 shows movements in the PSBR by sector: the
central qovernment's own borrowing requirement
(CCBR(OD 50, the local authorities'borrowing require-
ment (LABR) and the public corporations'borrowing
requirement (PCBR). It is clear that recent changes in
Trble 52
Generet Govcrnment Expendlture (Exctudlng Prlvetisrtlon Proceedsl(r'2)
es 96 of money GDP
1964-65
1965.66
1966-67
t967-5t
196t-69
t969-70
1970-71
t97t-72
1972-73
1973-74
351t4
37 rtt
38ttt
42w
40tA
40LA
4011
4l
4t
42u1
1974-75
1975-76
t976-77
t971-7t
r97t-79
1979.80
198Gt1
19tr{2
r9t2-t3
19t3-84
48
48rl2
46
42w
43 lr
43w
45 y1
46,Ln
45y1
45tn
19t4-85
1985-t6
1985-t7
19t7{t
19t&t9
19t9-90
1990.91
t99l-92
t992-93
199i94
46
44w
43w
4lw
38 yl
39
39 tx
39 ro
39w
39
(3e)
(3e)
(3t y1)
(38 v2)
(38 r)
B. Non.North See Texes, Natlonrl tnsurrnce Contrlbutlons end thc Communlly Cherge 1' 2)
es 9b oJ non.North See moneY GDP
t96/.65
1965-56
t96G57
1967-6t
t95t-69
1969-70
t970-71
t97t72
1972-73
1973-74
29w
3lr
32
33w
35r
37
36r
36ltl
32rz
33w
1974-75
t975-76
t97G77
t977-7t
1978-79
1979-tO
19t0-tl
19tl-82
19t2-83
r9t3.84
35w
36
36
35
34
35
36
38w
38
t9t4-85
19t5-t6
19tGt7
1987{6
19t&t9
1989-90
1990-91
t99t-92
t992-93
t99v94
37 tr
37
37w
37 eA
37
36tr
37 tr
36ttt
36
36
6ew)
Q7)
(36)
1ts w)
(35 rr)37w
1989-90 : Brrdsct esti-rti; 1990-91: Budget forecastl l99l-92 onwards: IV
n'"iioiin'u-r"c-r""ts 
"airii i"ittre distonion-arising from the replacement 
of
ncc : FSBR. March 1990
projecrions
4e)
s0)
The resuls show for the govemmemt's period of offrce a sharp decline in the expendiune-GDP ratio but a broad stability in
the tax-GDP ratio:seeTable 5.2.
"Own" u "O" here implies that onlending to local authorities and public corporations is exchded.
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(% ofGDP)
Calendaryears
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
gov€roDent
Currentrecdpts
- Taxesandsocialsecurlty 37,9 36,9 36,4 36,2 35,7 36.2
cbarTes
- Othcr
- To[el
Currentexpendlhrre
- FinalcoosumpUon
- Subddlcs
- Curentgronts
- Deb[ lntcrest
- Total
Curentsurplus
Flxedlnvestmnt
Other capltal ltems (net
recdpts)
F lnanclal balance, GGFB
Prlvatlsatlon recdpts
Otber flnamlal ltems
BorrcwlngrequlremenU
debtrepaymeat (CGBR)
(+=srrplus)
Publlc corporetlonc martet
and ovcrseas bormwlng
PSBR/PSDR
3,4 3,4 3,2 2,9 2,8 2,6
41,3 40,3 19,6 39,1 38,6 38,8
20,7 2n,7 20,3 19,6 tg,4 19,8
2,0 1,6 15 1,3 1,1 1,0
l4,l 13,9 13,2 12,2 lt,g l2,o
4,9 4,5 4,3 3,8 3.6 3,4
41,8 40,7 39,3 36,9 36,0 36,2
-0,5 -o,4 0,4 2,3 2,6 2,5
1,8 t,9 1,7 1,3 1,8 2,2
-0,4 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 -0.6
-2,8 -2,4 -1,3 1,0 0,9 -0,3
0,7 1,0 1,5 1,3 0,9 0,7
-03 0,6 -0,0 -0,5 -0,4 -0,1
-2,4 {,9 0,1 t,g 1,4 0,3
Financial years
rstt6 t9t6c, 19rr-66 19&LO l9t$90 rtG9l
37,2 36,7 36,7 35,9 355 36,7
3,9 3,3 3,1 2,9 2,E 2,4
4l,l ,(),1 39,8 38,8 38,3 39,1
2O,7 20,6 2O,2 t93 19,4 20,2
1,8 1,6 t,4 1,2 l,l 1,0
13,9 13,9 l3,t ll,8 llg 12,3
4,9 4,5 4,1 3,E 3,5 3,3
4t,2 lt0,5 38,8 35,1 35,9 36,7
-o,t {,5 1,0 2,7 2,5 2,4
1,9 I,E t,7 1,4 2,O 2,3
-0,3 -0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,5 -0.2
-2,4 -23 -0,6
oJ 1,1 t,2
4,2 4,1 4,1
-1,9 -1,2 0,4
t,4 0,0 -0,1
1,5 0,8 0,9
-0,5 0,4 -0,3
2,4 l3 0.5
0,3 0,3
-u -0,9
0,3 0,2
-2,1 -0,7
0,3 0,6 0,3 0,0
0,8 3,0 1,5 0,6
0,2 0,6 0,4 0,1
0,3 2,5 l,E 0.4
Movements in lhe PSBR/PSDR
1 oI GDP
2
I
0
-l
.,
-3
the PSBR/PSDR have been dominated by changes in the
CGBR(O), though the peak debt repayment in 1988-89
was supported by favourable coincident changes in the
LABR and PCBR.
The sharp decline in the negative CGBR(O) (lower debt
repayment) in 1989-90 is rather misleading as an indica-
tion of the extent of the easing of the fiscal stance. Avery
large (UKL 3,5 billion) transfer to the public corpora-
tions contributed. A second factor of a financial nature
was a decline of about UKL 3 billion in privatisation
receipts (a shortfall of about UKL I billion against pre-
vious expectations). Privatisation proceeds had pre-
viously built up progressively in the 1980s to peak ar
over UKL 7 billion in 1988-89 (in which year sales from
gas industry shares alone yielded over UKL 3 billion):
Graph 5.2shows the PSDR gross and net of privatisation
proceeds "'. A third particular reason for the decline in
the surplus in 1989-89 was a below-trend growth in
social security receiprs by about UKL 2 billion repre-
51 ) A UKL 2 billion reduction in 1989-90 privatisation proceeds compared with the previous financial year had been projeted in
Mrch 1989; ttre shortfall against expected proceeds was thus under UKL I billion.
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Graph 5.2
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senting contribution rebates offered by the government
in the 1989 Budget as a one-off incentive to take out
personal (i.e. private-sector) pension schemes.
Of these three factors tending to depress the CGBR(O)
on 1989-90 the first was PSDR-neutral while the remain-
ing two acted to reduce the PSDR. A third important
factor reducing debt repayment, and the only one which
clearly represented a more expansionary impact on the
economy, was higher than expected (by about UKL I
billion) capital expenditure by the local authorities
ahead of the inuoduction by central government of more
stringent controls on such expenditure from the 1990-9 I
financial year. Thus the "underlying" decline in the
PSDR between 1988-89 and 1989-90 was about UKL
I rn billion (O,4Vo of GDB a gross decline of UKL 6,6
billion offset by a UKL 2,9 billion reduction in privati-
sation proceeds and by over LJKL 2 billion of social
security rebates). Of this UKL I tz billion, about a half
represented lower tax revenues from North Sea oil and
gas revenues because of the major contraction ofProduc-
tion following the 1988 Piper Alpha and subsequent
accidents and also because of oil price weakness.
Developments in the first three quarters of the 1990-91
financial year indicate a further weakening in the public
finances. Conclusions nevertheless must remain tenta-
tive. In particular, the impact of the new local authority
finance arrangements, particularly the new poll tax
("Community Charge") and non-domestic property tax
("rating") system introduced in England and Wales from
April 52 and changes in the timing of expenditure have
been important and make comparison with earlier years
difficult. In the March 1990 Budget a UKL 7 billion
PSDR was projected, assuming that below-potential
growth would roughly offset the reversal of the special
factors that had depressed the 1989-90 outturn. How-
ever, up to December, the public sector had a cumulative
borrowing requirement of UKL 2,6 billion, compared
with a UKL 3,4 billion debt repayment in the same period
8 year earlier, with similar cumulative proceeds from
privatisation (UKL 3,7 billion against UKL 3,6 billion).
Of the total increase in net borrowing of LIKL 6,I billion,
central govemment accounted for the major share, IJKL
4,1 billion, while local authorities contributed UKL 2,8
billion; the PCBR dropped by UKL 0,9 billion. As re-
gards the local authorities, the new Community Charge
has been subject to large Payment atrears and its intro-
duction in general to higher collection costs of both a
current and capital nature. A huge element of local auth-
ority borrowing in the second quarter remaines unex-
plained:a balancing item of UKL 1,8 billion in addition
to an unprecedented accruals shortfall of IIKL 1,1 bil-
lion. Payment arears should be reversed in time.
More information is available for central Sovernment.
The Treasury estimates that departmental cssh outlsys in
the first nine months, excluding special factors, esPe-
cially the impact of centralised pooling and redisuibu-
tion ofbusiness property taxes to local authorities, were
l2?o up on a year earlier. On the receips side there were
cumulative increases of 8?o for taxes and charges com-
bined: l0% in direct taxes, 6 tn%o in the main expendi-
ture taxos nd 6112% in social security receipts. Thesc
increases compare with a planned nominal increase in
the planning total excluding privatisation proceeds for
the whole of 1990-91 of l0,54o and of 8,1% in taxes and
charges. The increase in cash expenditure may thus so
far be running somewhat ahead of the planned increase
while revenue has increased roughly in line.
A pointer to some weakening of control over expenditure
in the current financial year is the national accounts data
for the second and third calendar quarters of 1990. The
seasonally adjusted volume of general government con-
sumption expendirure increased by 4,0% ovcr a year
earlier with a higher increase for central government
consumption (4,7%). These increases still fall short of
those indicated by the summary cash data for total out-
lays in these two quarters, although the annual increase
in the latter fell back significantly in the fourth quarter.
These developments do not provide a firm foundation for
any very confident prediction of short-term public fin-
ance trends. In particular, unexplained borrowing so far
in 1990-91 points to timing influences which will zub-
sequently be partly reversed. On the other hand, the rapid
weakening in the economy from the third quarter can bc
expected to have an increasing effect on both receipt and
outlays, while the Gulf war, and the preceding military
build-up, will also put serious pressure on expenditure.
The Commission services in their autumn forecast, be-
fore the conflict, and assuming only moderate recession,
projected a UKL 3, I billion (0,5% of GDP) PSDR for the
52) In Scotlmd from April 1989.
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of GDP) PSDR for the current financial year, followed
by PSDRs of UKL 0,5 billion and llKL 1,6 billion in the
two following financial years.
3. The economic impact of UK budgetary
policy
While the MTFS has continued to give prominence to rhe
PSDR this is not necessarily the best guide to the
economic impact of fiscal policy. A major reason in the
UK's case is the significance of privatisation receipts,
which substitute for issuance of gilts as a source of
finance and which in financial year 1990-91 are likely ro
be higher than the PSDR itself. More generally, exclud-
ing financial transactiors which do not change the n€t
financial liabilities of the public sector, and the finances
of the public corporations which make difficult cross-
country comparison and for the UK alone have little
recent coverage continuity because of privatisation, sug-
gests focusing on changes in the general gove[unent
financial balance (GGFB).
Table 5.4 shows annual figures for the GGFB on both a
calendar year and financial year basis, with projections
of the Commission services up to 1992-93. The general
path resembles that for thePSBR excluding privatisation
proceeds. Thus the move to large financial surplus in
1988 coincides with that to net debt repayment, and there
is a move back to financial deficit in 1990-91 after rhe
small surplus in 1989-90.
However, the abrupt decline in the financial surplus
between 1988-89 and 1989-90 (UKL7,9 billion, 1,57o of
GDP) is explained by the same facrors underlying the
contraction of the PSDR berween the two years (apart
from the reduction in privatisation receipts), pointing to
the limitations of this measure also. Particularly, the
LrKL 3,5 billion capital grant to the coal indusrry, despite
affecting the GGFB, was of the nature of a financial
transaction and so too (to a degree depending on
consumers' ability to look forward) was the almost UKL
2 billion of social security contribution rebates. Only the
remaining decline in the financial surplus, some IJKL 2
tA billion On% of GDP), mostly accounted for by local
authority capital spending, was the main additional ex-
pansionary impulse. The expected move into financial
deficit in the current year is more clearly an expansion-
ary change.
The methods used in the past for assessing the economic
significance of changes in budget deficit - various cycli-
cal adjustments - have met with increasing resistance
and distrust on the part of both government and non-
government users. This is essentially because too much
weight came to be placed on their utility for a number of
different tasks: trying to isolate a "discretionary" ele-
ment in deficit changes, using them to assess the "sus-
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nability" of fiscal policy, or interPreting them as a
measure of the "impact" of policy. Thus a recent UK
Treasury Working Paper concluded that:
"We do not believe that the cyclically adjusted deficit
is a useful measure of discretionary fiscal policy -
partly because it is affected by many things outside
the government's control (e.g. unexpected changes in
interest rates, oil prices or tax receiPts), and partly
because acquiescence in changes in the automatic
stabilisers is as much an act of policy as a change in
tax or benefit rates" 53,
Cyclically-adjusted deficits were not dismissed, but as-
sessed more modestly:
"(they) may be useful as a benchmark for describing
and monitoring fiscal stance over the cycle, and for
assessing sustainability; for this to be the case... the
adjustment...must be measured around some level of
""iirity that is achievable in the medium-term..." 
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Recent work by OECD economists, based particularly on
work by Blanchard, has emphasised the need for several
indicators of fiscal policy, targeted to its different as-
pects: especially the description of the government's
budgetary position netting out as far as possible the
quasi-automatic cyclical effects (such that the remaining
Graflr 5.3
change is often termed discretionary); sustainability; the
dem_and impact; and finally allocational consequen-
ces tt. The calculations below are based largely on their
approach, although for past years absolute levels of some
indicators differ, probably because of using different
concepts ofnet debt and because ofdatarevisiont 56' Th"
allocational issue is not addressed.
The first issue is what movements have taken place in
the budgetary position net of cyclical inlluences. The
method of adjustment used in the past has often relied
on unrealistic estimates of potential outPut (peak-to-
peak measures, for example). Adjusting for the effects
of the cycle has been done below on two different bases,
following Chouraqui et al. First, a time trend of average
annual GDP growth over the last cycle (2,6% p.a- be'
tween 1979 and 1988) has been used as a measure of
attainable trend growth in the medium-tertn' and the
consequent output gaps used to make adjustments to
individual income and expenditure components 57. Th"
second approach, based on Blanchard, simply adjusts for
the difference in output between successive years, mak-
ing adjustments to the same general government account
items as in the first approach.
Graph 5.4
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53) H. Bredenkamp, The Cyclically Adjusted Deficit as a Measure of Fiscal Stance, Treasury Working Paper No52, APril 1988.
The statement is the resporuibility of fte author.
Idem.
J.-C. Chouraqui, R.P. Hagemann and N. Saror, Indicators of Fiscal Policy:a Reassessment, OECD Department of Economics
and Statistics Working Paper No.78, April 1990; O.J. Blanchrd, Suggestions for a new set of fiscd indicators, OECD
De,partment of Economics and Statistics Working Paper No. 79, April 1990.
The general govenrment tret detrt concept used by the OECD appeaf,s to be gross debt less short-term financid ssets. The
concept tsedhere is net financial liabilities, i.e. gross debt less all financial assets. Tlre difference is equivalent to at/tlJf-2Wo
ofGDP.
Items adjusted were household direct uxes, business direct taxes, irdirect taxes, social security contributions, other receips
and unenrployment bemefits. Output elasticities were taken from Chouraqui et al:l; 3,4; 0,7; 0,5; 1; md I respectively.
s6)
s7)
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Graphs 5.3 and 5.4 show the annual changes in the
financial and primary deficits (i.e. the financial deficit
before (net) interest paymeuts) using respectively the
two different adjustment methods with, in each case, the
change in the actual deficit. Although the two ap-
proaches do not yield ideutical results, particularly when
output movements are large, the general impression is
very similar. Even more strikingly, the adjusted changes
parallel the actual changes in the budget deficit.
If the cyclical adjustments are approriate, then the sub-
stantial movq into financial surplus towards the peak of
the last cycle can only partially be arrributed to the cycle;
Analogousln fiscal impulses cannot be put forward as in
any conventional sense responsible. On the other hand,
however, it is possible that the adjustments inadequately
capture the structures of the tax and expenditure systems
(fiscal drag in the case of personal income tax for ex-
ample) and thus exaggerate the restrictive impact of
fiscal policy in the move to surplus. In addition this
approach in no way captures what may have been an
expansionary impulse from the government signalling
current and expected future tax cuts in successive
Budgets.
The results for 1989 reflect the sharp erosion of the
PSDR referred to earlier, but equally illustrate the limita-
tions of the approach: the "catch-all" nature of the
residual change in the deficit shown in the charts in-
cludes items such as the drop in oil taxation and the
one-off social security rebates, the interpretation of
which as fiscal easing would be misleading.
Some of the weakening shown in 1990 is also suspect,
because of the large first quarter capital grant to a public
corporation (in the case of the trend output calculation
this would account for most of the deterioration). For
l99l the two methods differ, suggesting small increases
or decreases in the deficit. From 1992 the results con-
verge in indicating a very modest tightening.
An alternative, more direct approach to assessing the
demand impact of fiscal 2olicy is to use the indicators
developed by Blanchard )u:
. The first two of these assume that taxpayers are
forward-looking 59, taking into account the impact on
households'consumption of government real debt in-
terest and current and expected future tax levels (net
of government transfer receipts), and adding the direct
demand impact of government expenditure on goods
and services.
. The first of this pair, the forward-looking index of
fiscal impact (IFI) assumes that future years' taxes
are discounted by a trend real rate of interest and an
additional discount factor representing a "degree of
myopia".
. The second, an adjusted forward-looking deficit
(AFD), approximates the first measure, by taking an
average of tax ratios to GDP over the current and as
anticipated over the next four years and avoiding
any discounting or use of household spending
propensity.
. The second pair of measures are "fully myopic"
analogues of the first two, assuming that future tax
ratios are equal to current levels:
. the "myopic impact" (MFI) and
. the "inflation-adjusted deficit"(IAD) ) 50
Because the levels of fiscal impact indicators calculated
in this way are sensitive to the precise choice of ag-
gregates it is again more helpful to look at the annual
changes. The five year time horizon of the IFI matches
se)
60)
et at, oP ctL
The calculations which follow assume a five-year time horizon.
The foru measures are calculated as follows:
l.Index of fiscal impact (5-yeu time horizon), [FI:
IFIs - Gs + blrBs ,#-rl- fr - tr*[f f'
a
'llt *,rr-rrs.rll
2.:Adjusted forwardJooking deficit, AFD
AFD=C+rB-T
3.:Myopic fiscal impact, MFI
MFI=G+b(rB-T)
4. :Infl ation-adjusted deficit" IAD:
IAEGTIB-T
where
G is goverrmrent expendinre on goods srd services,
T is taxes net of transfers (T is the average level of T in the ctrrcnt urd following four yers)
B is net geirerd govemment financial liabilitie.s
r is the implicit real yield on B (3-year moving average, nomhal yield deflated by GDP muket prices deflator)
b is housetrolds' marginal consumpion propensity, taken as 0,77 srd
p is the degree of 'myopia", set to 3% p.a.
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that of the MTFS, and in a first calculation successive
editions of the MTFS have been used as indicators of
future tax ratios (assuming the "fiscal adjustments" such
as discussed on page 1 accrue in tax reductions). Transfer
payments to GDP ratios have been projected forward at
a flat initial year level in each case. The annual changos
in the four measures are shown in Graph 5.5 for calendar
years since 1986; forward-looking measures can be cal-
culated only up to 1990, while the "myopic" measures
are shown up to 1994.
With only two exceptions (the change in the inflation-
adjusted deficit between 1987 and 1988, and the changes
between 1988 and 1989) the year-to-year changes are
reasonably congrucnt. They suggest that, if the March
MTFS projections had always correctly anticipated the
future course ofthe public finances, and such projections
were credible, then policy would have had a tightening
demand impact up to 1989 and some expansionary im-
pact from 1990. Of particular note is the highly contrac-
tionary calculated impact of the forward-looking
measure in 1988, the peak of the last cycle (over 2% of
GDP): the 1987 MTFS projected a PSBR of l% of GDP
for the 1987-88 and successive years; the 1988 version
turned this into a PSDR of 3149o of GDP in 1988-89 (the
1987-88 outturn) and a zero balance thereafter.
Such indications are only tentative. In particular they
neglect divergences of outturn from projections (often
already large in the course of any cturent financial year)
and the consequent revisions ofexpected future deficits.
Graph 5.6 thus recalculates the four measures using only
outturn data and Commission services'projections' On
this basis policy has been shifted in an expansionary
direction with effect from 1989, with shifts of about
3l41op.a. indicatedfor 1990 and 1991. Although, inview
of the reasons for cautious interpretation of recent trends
entered earlier, not too much should be made of these
resulb, they point to a significant change from a 1988
position of extreme tightness.
4. The appropriate fiscal stance in the
medium-term
ln the March 1990 MTFS the government announced its
intention that "tight monetary and fiscal policies (would)
be maintained over the period covered by the MTFS so
as to achieve the (planned) deceleration in money GDP".
ERM membership, once the government's conditions
had been met, was seen as "complementary to the MTFS
policy framework". As noted at the end of the previous
section, fiscal projections pointed to a gradual fiscal
easing (zero PSDR by 1992-93), with output growth
back to its potential growth Path by the end of 1991 and
inflation low and on a firm downward track.
Current short-term ProsPects are significantly less fa-
vourable for both inflation and output. Sectoral imbal-
ances remain large, with still insufficient private sector
saving and a large external eficit. ERM membership,
with an imperative need to reduce inflation towards the
better performance of other members and with less inde-
pendent room for manoeuvre on interest rates' will prob-
ably focus greater attention on the government's fiscal
plans. In current circumstances the government will be
concerned not to unduly deepen the loss of potential
output which seems unavoidable in the short-term, but
at the same time to maintain a credibly tight policy
continuing to bear down on inllationary Pressures for the
medium-term.
This suggests a potentially enhanced role for the MTFS
as regards the role of fiscal policy' While, apart from
Germany, the experience of other ERM members poinrs
to a continuing role for some independence of monetary
policy action, it seems inevitable that the heavy em-
phasis on monetary policy in previous MTFSs will no
longer be appropriate. For fiscal policy the need is to
build a credibility in appropriate medium-term inten-
tions that has not, for the reasons given in Section 1, so
far been clearly established. This is likely to imply, in
current-eircumstances, transParent intentions for a firm
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medium-term fiscal policy path. At the same time the
potential need for a certain flexibility of budgetary re-
sponse has to be recognised, particularly if domestically
unwaranted changes in monetary conditions threaten to
render inappropriate the overall policy mix.
ERM entry has not therefore superseded the MTFS ap-
proach. lnstead, the lsttcr can now play an essential
complementary role in anchoring public exp€ctations of
stability-oriented policies over the medium term. The
fiscal stance cannot be decided independently of mon-
etary conditions - interest rates and the exchange rate -
and the existing imbalances in the economy - inflation
and the external deficit - nor, in practice, of the level of
real output in relation to its potential. What is required
is that the fiscal stance in combination with monetary
conditions should credibly contribute to a fairly rapid
rebalancing of the economy and most of all to disinlla-
tion. This might make it appropriate to formalise a me-
dium-term objective for the MTFS period, subject to
levels of real output and changes in monetary condi-
tions 61.
Judging how to respond to output changes - for example,
the current recession - is more difficult. It is already part
of the MTFS normally to accept the operation of the
fiscal stabilisers, "(setting) tax rates on medium to long
term considerations" "'. This seems desirable, and in
such circumstances the "underlying" MTFS fiscal path
could be considered as applying to a trend rate ofoutpur
growth and sharp fluctuations from the published pro-
jected output path considered as grounds for departing
from the fiscal targets.
However, extreme caution is called for. The analysis in
Section 3 suggested that cyclically-adjusted deficits did
not in practice diverge enormously from actual deficits.
Moreover, to the extent that below-potential growth
should promote disinflation, is inevitable and is partly a
response to existing policy, it is obviously not appropri-
ate to try to offset this completely. The stance of policy,
cyclically adjusted, should instead continue perceptibly
to bear down on inflation.
5. Longer-termconsiderations
The stated longer term fiscal objectives of the MTFS are
to reduce both public expenditure and taxation in rela-
tion to GDB to improve "value for money' in public
spending, to reduce tax rates, and to balance the budget
(PSDR/PSBR), implying a continuously falling debt-
GDP ratio "". rilithin this framework, the contribution of
expendituro and the tax system to the supply side is to
be enhanced; thus tax reform is an ongoing process and
a medium-term target of a 20% standard rate for income
tax (currently 25%) has been reirerated. A falling debt
interest burden and, more recentln prospects for reduced
defence reguirements, should enable I greater propor-
tion of resources to be channelled to other priority areas
of expendinrre.
At the macroeconomic level the UK's public finance
prospects offer considerable flexibility. There is clearly
no "sustainability" problem of potentially explosive
public debt growth. All conventional indicators of cur-
rent and prospective deficits reveal a fairly reassuring
picture, with general government's net financial lia-
bilities continuing to declinc in relation to GDP: see
Graphs 5.7 and 5.8, based on calculations ofcurrent and
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A "moderate deficit" might be targcted at a constant net general govemment financial liabilities to GDP ratio. Give,n a crurent
ratio of a little \n&r 20% and sustainable growth of around 2314% p.athis would imply a mediurn-terrn deficit target of
arcwrd'l 12% of GDP. Cf. the I 988 formulation of Ore IIFS with a modirmr-term targer for the PSBR excluding privatisation
receips of l% of GDP.
FSBR, Mrch 1990.
Idem.
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future financial deficits s. In such circumstances it
seems justifiable to consider more qualitative aspects of
the public finances.
he govemment's objective of a continuing reduction in
the tax burden might be called into question, given ap-
parent capital spending and other requirements:the need
to improve infrastructure, education and labour market
training to meet the challenges of the internal market
have received widespread discussion in the UK. Conti-
nuing reform of the tax structure could further improve
the supply side of the economY.
At the very least, it seems desirable that the government
should have a clear view of its ultimate objective for the
balance of public and private sectors in the economn
rather than the apparently limitless reductions in taxa-
tion and public expenditure in relation to GDP which are
currently the nominal objectives. More generally, there
is accumulating evidence that a substantial backlog of
infrastructural needs has been allowed to develop, not-
ably in transport and social capital such as prisons.
Against this background, it is disappointing that public
expenditure plans published in January 1990 continue to
indicate modest only levels of public investment.
Through the 1980s up to 1989-90 total public sector asset
creation showed little change in real terms. For the years
to 1992-93, where published capital expenditure plans
are available only for c€ntral government' expenditure
was due to rise by almost 6% in the current financial year
on the previous year, but thereafter to show a progressive
decline. Even a pro rata allocation of the expenditure
reserve to such expenditure would barely maintain the
1990-91 level.
There are nevertheless favourable circumstances for
public expenditure in the UK in the longer terrr: the
absence of pronounced demographic pressures (lower
dependency ratios than elsewhere) and little legacy of
past over-generous social welfare commitments. Against
such a background it seems appropriate to consider in
more depth how best to capitalise on these advantages in
combining improvements in the economy's supply side
with effective social provision.
6. Conclusions
Fiscal policy has been eased. The sharp decline in the
budget surplus between 1988-89 and 1989-90 neverthe-
less considerably overstates the degree of easing be-
tween these two years. Between the 1989-90 and the
current 1990-91 financial years policy has eased further
but to a degree which remains unclear from current
statistics. Expenditure has been under pressuro from the
introduction of the new local authority poll tax, from
sharply higher inflation and from intense Pressure to
increase the volume of expenditure. Prospects for a move
into financial deficit in the short-tertn are largely cycli-
cal in origin. While not necessarily inappropriate, such
prospects could be set in relation to an objective such as
a modest sustainable deficit over the medium term.
Changes in monetary conditions-perhaps not wholly vol-
untary-will also need to be taken into account in setting
the fiscal policy stance:it is important that the overall
stance of policy remains oriented to disinflation. ERM
participation should enable more credible presentation
and use of the MTFS approach.
In the longer term the general public finance environ-
ment is favourable. Advantage could be taken to enhance
the public sector's contribution to improving the supply
side of the economy, particularly by making up backlogs
in public infrastructure and improving the education and
training systems. This calls into question the extent of
the potential for further reductions in the ratios of tax
and public expenditure to GDP but not of continuing tax
reform.
64) The sustainabiliry indicaors re based on Blarchard and Chouraqui et al op. cir The sustainability condition is that the
debt-GDP ruio cannot grcw faster than the differerrce between the interest rate and the GDP gowth rate' if the former
exceeds the latter (if the latter exceeds the former tlrere cannot be a zustainability probbm). The "gaps" identified in CraPh
5.g show the differences benreen tlre average tax-GDP ratio and those needed to guarantee sustainabtity, based on the current
year, the forthcoming three years and the forthcoming five years respectively. Negative values indicate zustainability.
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